Teaching

The Christian Humanist Podcast, Episode #43: The Phaedrus and the Nature of Rhetoric

22 March 2011

General Introduction
- What’s on the blog?
- Listener feedback

Plato Gets Hostile
- Nathan explains Weaver
- Why does Plato hate rhetoric?
- Structure vs. content
- What is pleasant and what is good
- Giving the sophists a bad name

Weaver’s Platonic Allegory
- Farmer gets insulting
- Interpretation of the performances
- Good lovers, bad lovers, and non-lovers
- Hook-up culture
- Divine madness and lovesickness
- The move toward something higher and better
- Is Weaver overly simplistic?
- The return to sophistry

Weaver, Plato, and the Soul
- Rhetoric’s proper effect
- The Divine Mind
- Rhetoric and dialectic
- Weaver’s philosophical relativism

The Discourse of Business and the Discourse of the Poet
- Is this dichotomy out of date?
- Shop talk and the pitch
- Official style
- Scientific histrionics
- Is flat rhetoric active or passive?
- Academic BS

Analogy and Truthful Exaggeration
- Talking about things that are not yet
- Richard Weaver reads Hebrews
- Why it’s important to define the good

Teaching Composition
- The problem with Freshman Comp
- Assigning Phaedrus
- How to use the dialectic of good in the classroom
- Sneaking it into nonsectarian schools
- Nathan’s Plato/Boethius class


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Derrida, Jacques. Dissemination. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1983.

Frankfurt, Harry G. On BS. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 2005.

Plato. Gorgias. Trans. Chris Emlyn-Jones and Walter Hamilton. New York: Penguin, 2004.

—. Phaedrus. Trans. Christopher Rowe. New York: Penguin, 2005.

Weaver, Richard M. Language Is Sermonic: Richard M. Weaver on the Nature of Rhetoric. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1985.

Conservative Link Tank

11 March 2011

Deconstructing “The Real World”

16 February 2011

No, I have no plans to write anything at all about any MTV shows that may or may not still be on that network.  (Having been without cable for nearly five years now, it’s amazing how little I miss it.)  Instead, this little musing comes out of an encounter with a class that I’m teaching this semester, namely Emmanuel College’s capstone course, Senior Seminar.  To give a brief introduction that doesn’t overwhelm the post, Senior Seminar is a class that all students from all majors must take before graduating, and the one-credit-hour course focuses its discussion on the “big questions” of ethics, philosophy, and theology and how they stand to inform the professional lives that the students will enter when they finish college.

That students in such a class get the upper hand on me rhetorically is not unusual: because the point of the class is to reflect on the Christian faith and its interactions with all sorts of academic and professional learning, the conversations necessarily range into areas where I have no real expertise, and if students decide they want to one-up me, they have the tools to do so.

But this episode struck me as different: the students’ working assertion was not mainly that Emmanuel College’s environment stands in stark contrast to that of a public school’s expectations of secularity (a perennial topic in that class, since teacher education is our biggest major) but rather that, in a blanket sense, Emmanuel stands as a “bubble” in contrast to “the real world” presumably constituted by everywhere but Emmanuel College (or at least between places substantially the same as EC and those substantially different).

I started out my side of the dialectic by noting that the power to define “the real world” is not by any means self-evident: after all, one could just as easily interpret the world of paychecks and secularism as a world of “hollow men” (to borrow from T.S. Eliot) as compared to the full-chested human beings (to borrow from C.S. Lewis) of the Church.  Their response was not to argue but to sneer: in their minds, asking who defines “real world” is something akin to denying gravity (whose historical significance most of them probably couldn’t explain, I’m guessing) or calling into question whether in fact people who don’t eat for a while get hungry.

The rhetoric of the “real world,” of course, often travels hand in hand with the argumentum ad puerem.  If you’ve not heard that rhetorical term, it may be because only an annual report from the New England Society in 1912 seems to have used it first.  The usage I’m proposing is thus: an argumentum ad puerem is the sort of assertion that does not contest the content of a claim but rather paints the one making the claim as a mere child, one who would not make such an assertion if only he (or she) would “grow up.”  The reason I bring up (or invent) this phrase is that, in the use of “real world” in this class and in similar situations, the working assumption behind the term’s use seems to be that anyone who would contest the reality of “the real world” simply has been sheltered from “the real world,” for otherwise the claimant would certainly recognize that difference is merely immaturity.

Eventually, as I noted at the outset, I gave in not so much to the strength of my students’ arguments (there wasn’t any argument to oppose, as I can recall) but to mere fatigue: leaving class, I knew that I probably could have continued the exchange but wouldn’t have made much traction.  The way the Gospel of Mark tells it, not even Jesus could do much in the face of sneering, so I let class out, packed up, and started writing this post.

This little ditty is more of an invitation to inquiry than a point of my own: has anyone else encountered the argumentum ad puerem, or is it something that only wannabe Anabaptist English teachers face?  And when you have encountered it, has anyone had any success countering it with reasoned argument, or is it really the sort of unclean spirit that only comes out with prayer?

Fellowship of the Link

11 February 2011

Book Review: The Marketplace of Ideas

2 February 2011

The Marketplace of Ideas: Reform and Resistance in the American University
By Louis Menand.
174 pp. W.W. Norton. $14.95 (paperback)

I missed The Marketplace of Ideas when it was first released early last year, but its message has not faded in relevance in the intervening months–even as new books that seek to define what, exactly, is wrong with the American educational system are released weekly. Menand writes as a simultaneous outsider and insider, as he is both a professor of English at Harvard University and a well-loved staff writer over at The New Yorker. This dual position allows him to see and feel what’s wrong and right about the current state of the American university without getting too radical about his suggested changes. Indeed, Menand is no radical reformer. “There are things that academics should probably not be afraid to do differently,” he tells us, “but there are also things that are worth preserving, even at a cost, because the system cannot operate without them” (17-18). This measured reform is appreciated in a world–even an academic world–that would often prefer to deal in extremes.

Even so, Menand demands change on a systemic level. He is apt to pin the failures of the modern university on its birth in the late nineteenth century: “To the extent that this system still determines the possibilities for producing and disseminating knowledge, trying to reform the contemporary university is like trying to get on the Internet with a typewriter, or like riding a horse to the mall” (17). Many academics are likely inclined to agree with him; the problem is getting us to agree on how specifically the system should change. We’ve suggested on both the blog and the podcast, for example, that a return to Great Books-style education would be a vast improvement over the German Research model currently in place in most major American schools, but in his chapter on general-education curriculum, Menand does not work up any particular passion for core-curriculum programs. In the end, his conclusions are surprising, maybe even baffling–but more on that in a moment.

Menand, as he announces in his introduction, sets up the book as providing historical context (and occasional answers) to four questions: “Why is it so hard to institute a general education curriculum? Why did the humanities undergo a crisis of legitimation? Why has ‘interdisciplinarity’ become a magic word? And why do professors all tend to have the same politics?” (16). These questions will be familiar to anyone who hangs around an English department for any extended length of time, but Menand investigates them with great clarity. He approaches each topic as a historian rather than as an ideologue–so when, for example, he discusses general-education curriculum, the reader gets a delineation of several types of curricula, as well as a grounded history of Columbia University’s Lit Hum program (who knew it began as a course called War Aims?) and of Harvard’s famous “Redbook,” General Education in a Free Society. He also ties most of this history back into his central thesis, that the “modern” university system is a byproduct of the late nineteenth century and rather unsuitable for the demands of the contemporary world–which means we also receive a biography-in-miniature of Harvard presidents Charles William Eliot. (If you have problems with the modern university, feel free to blame Eliot, who, as Menand puts it, can be “identified with almost everything that distinguishes the modern research university from the antebellum college,” from “the abandonment of the role of in loco parentis” to “the introduction of the elective system for undergraduates” [44]).

Menand also has the appealing habit of refusing both conventional wisdom and factional assertions in academic battles. He does not even suggest that general-education curriculum is essential–let alone take sides on the electives vs. core curriculum battle that’s still raging in humanities departments. When discussing the legitimacy crisis, he refuses to pit Critical Theory in its many forms against Great Books programs (as lesser minds have done), instead noting that “Poststructuralism and cultural studies were not alien invasions in literary studies. They grew out o the normal practices of literature professors” (82). He praises certain advantages of interdisciplinarity but asserts that “It is not an escape from disciplinarity; it is the scholarly and pedagogical ratification of disciplinarity” (96-97). Menand, in his moderation, thus comes off like a voice of reason; you can disagree with him–and I do in several places–but you can’t accuse him of ideology, not with a straight face anyway.

Still, I find The Marketplace of Ideas lacking in a few areas. Menand does not discuss Christian colleges in even the most cursory of ways. This is, perhaps, not his job, but it’s interesting to me that at least two of his four questions don’t apply to most of the Christian schools I’m familiar with: With the centrality of the Bible and theology at these institutions, interdisciplinarity has always been a fact of life, and the battle over offering general-education curriculum typically never happens at Christian colleges–even if there’s a battle over whether it should be elective or core-based. It falls to some future scholar to demonstrate why Christian colleges can save education from the problems Menand delineates.

Even disregarding this omission, I find Menand’s final advice rather baffling. The solution to the group-think of college professors–Menand is open-eyed enough not to deny that it exists, although he notes that Roger Kimball probably should have called his book Tenured Moderate Liberals–could also, he implies, be the solution to the crisis of legitimacy and the problems of interdisciplinarity and general-education curriculum:

The moral of the story that the numbers tell once seemed straightforward: if there are fewer jobs for people with PhDs, then universities should stop giving so many PhDs–by making it harder to get into a PhD program (reducing the number of entrants) or harder to get through (reducing the number of graduates). But this has not worked. Possibly the story has a different moral, which is that there should be a lot more PhDs, and they should be much easier to get. The non-academic world would be enriched if more people in it had exposure to academic modes of thought, and had thereby acquired a little understanding of the issues that scare terms like “deconstruction” and “postmodernism” are attempts to deal with. And the academic world would be livelier if it conceived of its purpose as something larger and more various than professional reproduction–and also if it had to deal with students who were not so neurotically invested in the academic intellectual status quo. (154)

Well, yes, those things would be great. The problem is that the world has already nearly completely devalued a high-school education and is well on the way to devaluing the bachelor’s degree. A BA or BS is already standard for nearly every decent job in the world–even most receptionist positions, as I can tell you from personal experience, require an AA and prefer a BA–and many or most of them require a master’s. If we make the threshold even higher for decent work, Menand’s very democratic and reasonable educational system will undo itself. The solution, it seems to me, is to stop telling every high schooler to go to college and for employers to stop requiring college degrees for jobs that don’t really need them.

The solution can’t be as easy as all that, of course–I and many of my colleagues would likely be out of a job–but it would at least begin the process of purifying the college experience. Those students who wanted to go into careers that realistically required advanced degrees–or those who wanted to develop themselves in the language and thoughts of Western culture–could attend college. Others could go to trade or business school and learn skills that might actually be useful for their careers. I’m not 100 percent behind the plan I’ve outlined here, but I like it more than I like Menand’s, which is so democratic that I fear it will end up undoing the educational system altogether.

Even so, The Marketplace of Ideas is well worth a read for anyone who’s interested in the successes, failures, and future of American education. Menand asks the right questions and gives the reader enough background to decide on his or her own solutions.

Link Cadillac

21 January 2011

I Link. I’m Gonna Kill Myself.

7 January 2011

(Yeah, I’m proud of that title.)

A Link in our Armor

17 December 2010

Link Elephants on Parade

10 December 2010

On Teaching Plato One Mo’ Time

1 December 2010

In the spring semester of 2006, I overheard a conversation going on in the hallway between two of my graduate student colleagues at the University of Georgia. The funny thing is I do not remember the content of the conversation so much as I retain an impression that they were discussing some traditionalist’s most recent column about the death of traditional liberal arts education.  Whatever they were saying, it inspired me to put down whatever I was working on at the moment and start running an Amazon.com search for copies of Republic by Plato.  Within the next few days I put together a proposal for a special topics section of freshman composition, one in which the students would write papers about that famous and perhaps even often-read dialogue, and now, 4 1/2 academic years later, on Monday I finished up teaching that wonderful book for the fourth time.

This time, of course, the context was different. I am no longer the vaguely subversive traditionalist graduate student at a gigantic State University; instead, I am teaching the honors section of freshman composition at a small Christian college.  And this time, I am a vaguely subversive (for some of the same reasons, believe it or not) traditionalist assistant professor.  But Plato persists, and in this context, it’s better than ever teaching this wonderful old book.

I tell my students at the beginning of every semester in which we read Republic that people have been reading Plato for more than two thousand years not because he has good answers but because he’s a pioneer in asking good questions.  Not content with the assertion that human government should be just, he wants to know what justice is.  And in the course of investigating that question, he opens up questions about the nature of education, how women and men relate to one another, who counts as a countryman and who deserves no such respect, whether human desires are all of a kind or whether some stand superior to others, what sort of constitution is best for a city, and about four hundred pages of other hard, worthwhile questions.  By the time my students finished the book, they had the occasion (even if they did not seize the occasion) to encounter questions that make disciplines like physics, history, sociology, economics, psychology, and even literary studies intelligible, and they became familiar with the sorts of questions that were still alive when Jesus did his earthly ministry in Palestine.  Since our college stands dedicated to the integration of faith and learning, Republic is in many ways our college’s best friend.  Today, in a departure from what I did (or could do, really) at the University of Georgia, we did a close reading of the Sermon on the Mount, noting where those questions were still alive as Jesus addressed the Galilean crowds those four hundred years after Plato, and my students seemed to connect, in proportion to what they had read, with the persistence of those questions for Christian theology.  In the process of doing so, we did indeed talk psychology, anthropology, and all sorts of other groovy things in relationship to that wonderful discourse of Jesus.  It was a good day.

Beyond the questions that I can ask and remain legitimate within the institutional mission, there’s more of a sense at Emmanuel that I’m talking to a group of people who experience their lives as called.  At UGA, as I’ve written before, there was absolutely no common sense of institutional mission.  People could generally root for the same minor league football team (although I did have the occasional LSU partisan in my classes), but there was little sense that anything but the atomized, individualistic goals of each student counted for anything in the grand scale.  At Emmanuel, the challenge is less establishing that there might be a God who calls the students and more establishing that the actual content of classwork might be the stuff of their mission.  Although many if not most of the students would agree with the assertion that God has called them to serve Church and world, many of them need some convincing that what we do in freshman composition has anything to do with that call.  Even given such, I do come into my classes here feeling like I’m starting from a better place.  Perhaps I get too excited about starting from the 20-yard line rather than from the two, but at least among the folks whom I taught this semester, they really did seem to grab onto what Plato was offering as a vision for the ends and aims of education, something that really I’d only ever experienced before among my ROTC students at UGA.  Beyond that general sense of mission, as I mentioned before, I really do get the sense among this group that they’re going to go back to their Bible studies and Sunday school classes reading the New Testament a bit differently–they now have a set of tools for reading that they hadn’t used before, and they see that Paul, when he writes about “elders” and “deacons,” has some genuinely serious stuff in mind, not just picking the folks who carry the offering plates on Sunday mornings.

In my own encounters with the world, I confess that I remain a Thomist Aristotelian, certainly modified by some German dialectical thought but in all of those influences solidly committed to finding the meaning of the world in the world rather than deferring meaning to that-which-lies-beyond in any simplistic manner.  I’m still suspicious of philosophies that would treat Heaven as simply another “level” of earth and that do not have Thomas’s analogical reserve about pronouncing on heavenly things.  And I tend to be a conservative politically, preferring Congressional declarations of war and citizen-militia systems where armies stand for only two years at a time (that’s article one, section eight of the Constitution, for those keeping score at home) to the modernized, professional armed forces that go anywhere a president bids them go at a moment’s notice.  For that matter, I tend to think of so-called “immoral” literature as some of the best stuff for moral education precisely because it stands to highlight the horror of evil and stir a sense of fear and pity.  I’m not Platonist, I assure you.  Even so, there’s still no book I can think of that I enjoy teaching to freshmen more than Republic.

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