Posts Tagged science

The Christian Humanist Podcast, Episode #51: Archaeology

18 June 2011

General Introduction
- The perils of Vacation Bible School
- Introducing our guest
- Listener feedback
- Grubbsy’s new job

The Topic at Hand
- Indiana Jones, of course
- What tools archaeologists actually use
- Other people’s junk
- Archaeology as destructive science
- Slow but steady

The Pre-Archaeological Imagination
- Hebrew slaves and the pyramids
- Anglo-Saxon David and Goliath
- What does archaeology contribute to our sense of history?
- The everyday life of the ancients

The Effect of Archaeological Exploration on Biblical Commentary
- The Enuma Elish and Genesis as polemical text
- The prophets and the cave paintings
- The Bible as sacred texts among texts
- Gilmour goes Calvinist
- Greek philosophers plagiarize the Bible

Christian Biblical Studies and Mainstream Archaeology
- Their rocky relationship
- The argument over the Exodus
- The failures of the Israelites
- The liberal Protestant response
- Polyvocal history
- Reactionary conspiracy theories
- How archaeology helps us read Lewis and Tolkien

Luke’s Particular Dig Site
- Khirbet Qeiyafa
- David and Goliath
- Did David even exist?
- When did Israel become a kingdom?
- The big city on the border
- Naming as interpretation

Hoaxes and False Proofs
- Noah’s Ark
- Filmmakers and archaeologists
- Ancient recycling
- The Naked Archaeologist and the nails
- Joseph Smith’s bad archaeology
- Phony archaeologists as flattering to the profession
- News coverage of the sciences

Our Advice
- Treat archaeology as a tool, not a final answer
- Don’t ignore archaeology
- Recognize that archaeological interpretations frequently change


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brueggemann, Walter. Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005.

Calvin, John. Commentary on the Psalms. Trans. David C. Searle. Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 2009.

Dalley, Stephanie. Myths from Mesopotamia: Creation, the Flood, Gilgamesh, and Others. New York: Oxford UP, 2009.

Dodge, Arthur J. Homer or Moses?: Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture. Philadelphia: Coronet, 1988.

Kagan, Donald. The Peloponnesian War. New York: Viking, 2003.

Philo. The Works of Philo. Trans. C.D. Yonge. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2005.

 

The Christian Humanist Podcast, Episode #46: Cybernetics

12 April 2011

BLOOPBLEEPBLURGH

General Introduction
- What’s on the blog?
- The feud continues
- Polymathery

Cybernetics as Governance
- Not a portmanteau!
- Getting organized as a spiritual gift
- Rudder-steerer
- Modern definition
- Military purposes
- David Grubbs’s computer-programming past
- Feedback loops and exploding robot heads
- Cyborgs vs. androids

The Myth of Theuth
- Writing and memory
- Dialectic as a cure for writing
- The irony of the Phaedrus
- Writing as technology
- How providential is the time of Christ’s coming?
- (The use and misuse of providence)
- What are we giving away?

Cultural Cyborgs
- How the Tin Man became tin
- Blade Runner complicates memory
- Poe tries to get funny
- Cybernetics, villains, and disability
- Are children afraid of Darth Vader?

Heidegger: The Video Game
- Is the Guitar Hero stage part of Dasein?
- The appeal of video games
- Expanding the world
- Heidegger’s hammer and the physical world
- Entering into stories

The Technological Classroom
- Look-up-ability
- Memorizing facts to connect facts
- Spell check—quelle horreur!
- Phone numbers and birthdays
- Our limitless memories
- Nathan’s inability to memorize Bible verses

Where Do We Draw the Line?
- Are eyeglasses cybernetic?
- Resisting technology
- Why you never shed human limits
- Technology is part of humanism
- Breaking cell phones

The Takeaway Point
- Humanity doing its job
- Avoid idolatry
- Grace and avenues of it
- Breaking the mind/body dualism
- Be willing to change your anthropological model

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abe, Kobo. The Box Man. New York: Vintage, 2001.

—. The Face of Another. New York: Vintage, 2003.

Barrie, J.M. Peter Pan. New York: Henry Holt, 2003.

Baum, L. Frank. The Wonderful Wizard of Oz. New York: North-South, 1999.

Derrida, Jacques. Dissemination. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1983.

Dick, Philip K. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? New York: Oxford UP, 2007.

Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie. New York: Harper, 2008.

Melville, Herman. Moby-Dick. New York: Oxford UP, 2008.

Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. Christopher Rowe. New York: Penguin, 2005.

Poe, Edgar Allan. “The Man That Was Used Up.” Poetry and Tales. Ed. Patrick F. Quinn. New York: Library of America, 1984.

Postman, Neil. Technopoly. New York: Vintage, 1993.

Little Shop of Linkers

4 March 2011

Science Hit-and-Run

9 December 2010

Theoretical Breakthrough: Generating Matter and Antimatter from Nothing

“Under just the right conditions — which involve an ultra-high-intensity laser beam and a two-mile-long particle accelerator — it could be possible to create something out of nothing, according to University of Michigan researchers.”

“Nothing” seems to include an awful lot of equipment. Someone please explain creation ex nihilo again to these people.

Lost Civilization Under Persian Gulf?

Historical sea level data show that, prior to the flood, the Gulf basin would have been above water beginning about 75,000 years ago. And it would have been an ideal refuge from the harsh deserts surrounding it, with fresh water supplied by the Tigris, Euphrates, Karun, and Wadi Baton Rivers, as well as by underground springs. When conditions were at their driest in the surrounding hinterlands, the Gulf Oasis would have been at its largest in terms of exposed land area. At its peak, the exposed basin would have been about the size of Great Britain, Rose says.

Tigris and Euphrates, eh? That reminds me of something. Oh yeah.

Giant Storks May Have Fed on Real Hobbits

The extinct predator could have fed on fishes, lizards and birds, “and possibly in principle even small, juvenile hobbits, although we have no evidence for that,” she said. “These birds are opportunistic carnivores — if you give them plenty of prey items, they’ll hunt all of them.”

There are no signs yet of whether hobbits returned the favor by hunting these birds. “No cut marks are seen on any of its bones,” Meijer said.

Homer was apparently quite well-informed:

When the companies were thus arrayed, each under its own captain, the Trojans advanced as a flight of wild fowl or cranes that scream overhead when rain and winter drive them over the flowing waters of Oceanus to bring death and destruction on the Pygmies, and they wrangle in the air as they fly; but the Achaeans marched silently, in high heart, and minded to stand by one another. (Iliad III)

Medieval England Twice as Well Off as Today’s Poorest Nations

New research led by economists at the University of Warwick reveals that medieval England was not only far more prosperous than previously believed, it also actually boasted an average income that would be more than double the average per capita income of the world’s poorest nations today.

Say what you will about the tenets of feudalism — at least it’s an ethos.

Before the Link can Dry

3 December 2010

Loose Thoughts on Epicurus

4 November 2010

Every now and then, I come across an author whose work is radically different from what I’ve always thought. Whether the fault of the misunderstanding lies with my teachers or with myself I cannot tell, but it exists nevertheless, and an actual reading of the work shatters my misconceptions. I had this experience, for example, when reading Nietzsche for the first time: He is by no means the nihilist he is often made out to be; he doesn’t have an anti-Semitic bone in his body, and if his philosophy is destructive, it is a creative destruction that seeks to tear down only to build a new edifice.

I had the same experience a few weeks ago when reading Epicurus–who, I must say, I’d heard little about other than the term “Epicurean,” which is usually applied to an “eat, drink, and be merry” philosophy of hedonism. As is so often the case, our middlebrow slang gets it just right enough to be more distressingly wrong.

Epicurus himself is really more about virtue than about pleasure–the difference between his time and our own, however, is that the two were for him intimately connected. Like Aristotle, Epicurus views pleasure as the highest virtue, which is a hard thing for people in Christian and post-Christian cultures to understand. But for the Greeks, pleasure is in itself a good, “the first and natural good,” and all other goods must be judged in accordance with pleasure (129a). It’s because of his focus on pleasure that Epicurus is popularly considered an abject hedonist—a reputation that apparently existed in his own day (he mentions it in 131b).

But Epicurus ethic is not one of all-out hedonism, and if he advocates the quest for pleasure, it’s in a rather measured way:

Every pleasure is a good since it has a nature akin to ours; nevertheless, not every pleasure is to be chosen. Just so, every pain is an evil, yet not every pain is of a nature to be avoided on all occasions. By measuring and by looking at advantages and disadvantages, it is proper to decide all these things. (129b-130a)

He’s really advocating a kind of individual utilitarianism here—one must weigh out the greatest benefit to oneself and accept it, even if it means undergoing pain or forsaking pleasure momentarily. Pleasure is still the end goal, but you can’t attain pleasure by merely chasing after it every chance you get.

Indeed, Epicurus seems to suggest a kind of “aesthetic asceticism”—we should live as simply and quietly as we can, gaining pleasure from the small things instead of grabbing everything that comes our way. The reason, of course, is practical: We will be happier this way. As he puts it elsewhere: “Those desires that do not bring pain if they are not satisfied are not necessary; and they are easily thrust aside whenever to satisfy them appears difficult or likely to cause injury” (“Principal Doctrines”148). Again, this is a long way from abject hedonism.

I do not mean to suggest that Epicureanism is in any way compatible with the Christian life. Indeed, Epicurus’ philosophy anticipates nothing so much as the rationalism and scientism of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment; he holds to strikingly modern views of the natural world, including atomism and an early version of Gould’s non-overlapping magisteria, and the gods in which he apparently believes are far removed from human life. His argument for polytheistic deism is strange but elegant: “That which is blessed and immortal is not troubled itself, nor does it cause trouble to another. As a result, it is not affected by anger or favor, for these belong to weakness” (“Principal Doctrines” 139). Thus, the gods must be perfect and immovable. It’s very Aristotelian in the sense of the Unmoved Mover of the Metaphysics.

Science is mankind’s savior, says Epicurus, and is necessary for living the good life because

It is not possible for one to rid himself of his fears about the most important things if he does not understand the nature of the universe but dreads some of the things he has learned in the myths. Therefore, it is not possible to gain unmixed happiness without natural science. (143)

Science has value because it and it alone can rid society of harmful superstitions. Both what we moderns call philosophy and what we call science function to reduce the fear of death; in this sense philosophy is, as the old cliché puts it, “learning how to die.”

Much of the “Letter to Menoeceus” is concerned with death, and its on this topic that Epicurus deserves to be called a stoic. Indeed, he instructs his pupil to “Accustom yourself to the belief that death is of no concern to us, since all good and evil lie in sensation and sensation ends with death” (124b). I’m not sure this follows, though—aren’t we concerned with more than mere sensation? Isn’t the problem with death that it’s a cessation of existence, and isn’t that something worth taking seriously?

Indeed, Epicurus seems to treat death as a thing in itself, as opposed to the cessation of all things. He treats it as the polar opposite of human consciousness: “while we exist death is not present, and when death is present we no longer exist” (125). But I’m not convinced that’s an appropriate way to think about death—it’s nothingness, a black hole that sucks all life into it.

I do like one thing he says, though, and it fits in nicely with what Martin Heidegger calls “being-towards-death”: “Remember that the future is neither ours nor wholly not ours, so that we may neither count on it as sure to come nor abandon hope of it as certain not to be” (127a). This is sound advice, to be sure, even for Christians, who historically opposed Epicurus’ Roman disciples, causing the philosophy to go underground until the eighteenth century.

At any rate, Epicurus is worth a reading for at least two reasons. First, he is an excellent writer and a lot of fun to read. If you’ve ever slogged through Aristotle or the later Plato, you will appreciate a Greek philosopher who is relatively breezy. Second, whether the influence is acknowledged or not, he is a major forerunner of the nü atheism and a great deal of help in understanding the underlying assumptions of that movement.

Link This!

8 October 2010
  • Gain some perspective on the sizes of things in the universe.
  • Gain some perspective on the relative volumes of communications traffic.
  • The Kindlings Muse has another great lecture from one of my (MF) personal heroes, Dr. Harold Best.
  • Alan Jacobs ponders the disregard for complexity and truth on the Internet.
  • Tracey Rowland on the reactions against “sacro-pop”
  • James K.A. Smith suggests some new vocabularies for discussing the phenomenon of “Christian hipsters”
  • Tony Jones agrees with William T. Cavanaugh that the eucharist is always a political act.
  • NPR’s Intelligence Squared USA takes on the question of terrorism and enemy combatants in a refreshingly honest debate.
  • Chris Heard opines briefly on Wikipedia and the glaring lack of students’ confidence in their own abilities to read Biblical texts.
  • Are mime shows ever amusing?  Nate Gilmour thinks this one is (just watch it in the little window; the compression makes it look horrible  for full-screen):

Short Takes: Morality, Monkeys, and Confirmation Bias

13 August 2010

Here’s a headline designed to set off the irony sirens: “Expert on Morality Is on Leave after Research Inquiry”. Turns out the story’s more about confirmation bias than about hypocrisy:

Dr. Hauser is one of Harvard’s most visible academics, being frequently quoted in articles about language, animals’ cognitive abilities and the biological basis of morality. He is widely regarded as a star in his field.

In a widely noticed book of 2006, “Moral Minds,” he argued that a universal moral grammar is genetically wired into the human mind, similar to the universal grammar posited by Noam Chomsky to underlie the language faculty. Dr. Hauser is currently working on a book called “Evilicious: Why We Evolved a Taste for Being Bad.”

Dr. Hauser is a fluent and persuasive writer, and his undoing seems to have been his experiments, many of which depended on videotaping cotton-topped tamarin monkeys and noting their responses. It is easy for human observers to see the response they want and so to be fooled by the monkeys.

In other words, Dr. Hauser looked for evidence of moral behavior among the cotton-topped tamarins, and so saw it. Other scientists watched the same tapes and didn’t see what Dr. Hauser saw, probably because they weren’t looking for it. Two points, then I’m done:

  1. Generally, when told confidently that “research has shown X,” ask for the details of the research, especially when that research claims to cross the NOMA border.
  2. More specifically, our Lord, in His “Sermon on the Mount,” made it clear that morality is a matter not merely of behaviors, but also–and especially–of intentions. Science has a place for physical behaviors, but mental intentions are inscrutable to it. Attempts to scientifically account for morality will inevitably treat mental intentions as physical behaviors, a move destructive to science and rationalism.

Now I’m done.

The Christian Humanist, Episode #22.1: Science

23 June 2010

Our outro music this week comes from Michael Knott’s 1994 record Rocket and a Bomb. The song’s called “Jan the Weatherman.” Hey, “Jan” rhymes with “Dan,” and our special guest this week is tornado chaser Dr. Dan Dawson. He’s kind of a weatherman, anyway.

General Introduction
- Where’s David Grubbs?
- Welcome to our special guest
- What’s on the blog?

Our History with Science
- Dan Dawson dreams of tornadoes
- Michial’s near-failures
- Easy science at Milligan College

Ancient Science
- The four elements
- Aristotle and the geocentric universe
- Methodological contributions
- Rapidly changing science
- A gratuitous shot at 2012

Arab Investigators and Medieval Science
- Why Nathan doesn’t call it science
- Elaborate biology
- Effect on Medieval drama

The Rise of Modern Science
- Reverence for mathematics
- Science as a self-correcting system
- How philosophical is your average scientist?
- “Whatever works”
- No sense of history

Tornadoes
- The Wizard of Oz
- A history lesson
- Electric tornadoes
- How tornadoes work
- But can we fix it?

Mad Scientists and the American Renaissance
- Emerson, Poe, and the War on Science
- Romanticism and the Enlightenment
-
Hawthorne and the dangers of scientific perfection
- Melville and the unspeakable
- The death of the imagination

Dan Defends Science
- The move toward the holistic
- A sense of mystery
- The end of history
- The myth of progress

A New Kind of Science
- The ecological movement
- Merging the Romantic and the scientific
- Interdisciplinary interaction

Scientific Threats to Christianity
- Hegel, Nietzsche, Dawkins
- Integration by example, not argument
- Learning from the nü atheists
- Are confessing Christians a lunatic fringe?

The Limits of Science
- Physics and metaphysics
- The limits of theology
- The geocentric universe and evolution
- Non-overlapping magisteria
- The natural shift
- Why we’re frustrated with militant atheism and militant creationism

What We Need to Know
- Science is your ally
- The what questions and the why questions

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aristotle. On the Heavens. Trans. J.L. Stocks. Complete Works of Aristotle. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1984. 447-511.

—. Sense and Sensibilia. Trans. J.I. Beare. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1984. 693-713.

Bacon, Francis. The Major Works. Ed. Brian Vickers. New York: Oxford UP, 2008.

Baum, L. Frank. The Wonderful Wizard of Oz. New York: Signet, 2006.

Dawkins, Richard. The God Delusion. New York: Mariner, 2008.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo. “Each and All.” Collected Poems and Translations. New York: Library of America, 1994. 9-10.

Hawthorne, Nathaniel. “The Birth-Mark.” Tales and Sketches. New York: Library of America, 1982. 764-780.

—. “Rappaccini’s Daughter.” Tales and Sketches. New York: Library of America, 1982. 975-1005.

Melville, Herman. “The Lightning-Rod.” Pierre, Israel Potter, The Piazza Tales, The Confidence-Man, Tales, Billy Budd. New York: Library of America, 1985.

—. Moby-Dick. New York: Norton, 1967.

Poe, Edgar Allan. “Sonnet—To Science.” Poetry and Tales. New York: Library of America, 1984. 38.

Sagan, Carl. Contact. New York: Pocket, 1997.

Snow, C.P. The Two Cultures. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993.

Attack of the Pathetic Fallacy

23 April 2010

I do not recall when I first encountered the notion of a pathetic fallacy: a literature course, doubtless, but I’ve had many of those. I was almost certainly an undergraduate, because the pathetic fallacy was introduced simply as a term, with a plain, dry definition; I was told nothing of its connotative implications, and we certainly didn’t read John Ruskin’s essay, “Of the Pathetic Fallacy.” The definition I was given was very like the one provided by Wiktionary at the link above: “[T]reating inanimate objects or concepts as if they were human beings, for instance having thoughts or feelings.” It was, I was taught, synonymous with such terms as anthropomorphism and personification. What I was not told was the attitude implicit in the term, expressed in the bit I omitted from the definition above: the pathetic fallacy is “an error in logical argumentation.” Thus does the Victorian Ruskin employ the word “fallacy,” because, for him, art’s paramount concern is to be true, to see the world as it is, so that personification is a frivolous fiction or a lapse of sanity:

[i]t is the fallacy of wilful fancy, which involves no real expectation that it will be believed; or else it is a fallacy caused by an excited state of the feelings, making us, for the time, more or less irrational. (5)

Not that the pathetic fallacy is not pleasing, but “it is only the second order of poets who much delight in it,” while “the greatest poets do not often admit this kind of falseness” (6). Such poets rise above the mind-bending caprice of emotion:

[T]he intellect also rises, till it is strong enough to assert its rule against, or together with, the utmost efforts of the passions; and the whole man stands in an iron glow, white hot, perhaps, but still strong, and in no wise evaporating ; even if he melts, losing none of his weight. (8)

The rational, unpoetical man sees autumn leaves moved about by the wind; the irrational, poetical man sees dancing autumn leaves; but the rational, poetical man sees autumn leaves move as if dancing, his logical mind careful to preserve the self-awareness of simile.

But all of this Ruskinage is preamble! Let’s move on to Tolkien, shall we?

Awakening Metaphor and the Song of Willows

The moment to which I wish to draw your attention, dear reader, occurs about halfway through Book 1 of The Lord of the Ring, as Frodo and company begin their furtive journey to Rivendell by way of the perilous Old Forest. The Old Forest, says Merry Brandybuck, is “very much more alive” than the tame woods of the Shire (121). This “aliveness” is referenced many times as they ride fearfully through the forest, yet Tolkien carefully hedges the hobbits’ perceptions with the language of subjectivity: they “got an uncomfortable feeling” that the tree were watching them, “the trees seemed constantly to bar their way,” “it seemed to them that the Forest relented,” etc. (122, 123).

Having been prepped throughout childhood with spook tales of the Old Forest, the hobbits are emotionally overwrought, alternately panicked and despondent as they get more and more lost. They are, according to Ruskin, in a state particularly susceptible to the pathetic fallacy: “[T]hat of a mind and body in some sort too weak to deal fully with what is before them or upon them; borne away, or over-clouded, or over-dazzled by emotion” (8). Tolkien’s emphasis on feelings and “seeming,” accompanied by the hobbits’ mounting anxiety, encourages readers to be skeptical of these perceptions of “aliveness”–we sympathize with the poor little guys, but they seem only to be lost hikers freaking themselves out.

When, in the end, they leave the deep woods and find themselves in the Withywindle Valley–not the place they’d meant to go–the hobbits’ paranoia about the Old Forest has peeked: they are convinced that the trees have driven them to the Withywindle River for some sinister purpose. However, Frodo and company are also exhausted. After emerging from the stuffy woods, they walk for a time in the cool shade of the willows, then all begin to feel drowsy. This seems natural enough: it’s been a hard journey, and the combination of shade, a cool breeze, and the lulling rustle of willow leaves make for an ideal outdoor nap. The hobbits process these conditions as they have all phenomena in the Old Forest: they personify them.

There now seemed hardly a sound in the air. The flies had stopped buzzing. Only a gentle noise on the edge of hearing, a soft fluttering as of a song half whispered, seemed to stir in the boughs above. [Frodo] lifted his heavy eyes and saw leaning over him a huge willow-tree, old and hoary. Enormous it looked, its sprawling branches going up like reaching arms with many long-fingered hands, its knotted and twisted trunk gaping in wide fissure that creaked faintly as the boughs moved. [...]

[...] [Merry and Pippin] looked up at the grey and yellow leaves, moving softly against the light, and singing. They shut their eyes, and then it seemed that they could almost hear words, cool words, saying something about water and sleep. They gave themselves up to the spell and fell fast asleep at the foot of the great grey willow. (127-8)

If one is unaware of what happens next, this is actually a pleasant scene, and also a poetically apt description of napping under a willow tree, which I’ve done and can recommend.

Unfortunately for Frodo and company, the scene continues: the willow flings Frodo into the river, then seals up Merry and Pippin within the fissures of its massive trunk. The old willow is alive. The hobbits’ pathetic fallacy is not fallacious, but precisely descriptive. Their fears are not irrational projections on inanimate nature, but completely justified. The rustling leaves were not like a voice: they were a voice that “rustled and whispered, but with a sound now of faint and far-off laughter” (129). The willow is alive, aware, and active; Tolkien’s emphasis on feeling and “seeming” is a trick, lulling readers as surely as the leaves lulled the hobbits. He permits us to get comfortable in the familiarity of metaphor–and then he wakes the metaphor up, and we find we were never safe, that we walked in Faërie and knew it not.

Rejoicing or a Passable Simulation Thereof?

I certainly admire this as a literary technique, but it’s also made me think about how I read poetry, especially the poetry of scripture. Consider, for example, the following excerpts from two very similar psalms, Psalm 96 and Psalm 98:

10Say among the heathen that the LORD reigneth: the world also shall be established that it shall not be moved: he shall judge the people righteously.
11Let the heavens rejoice, and let the earth be glad; let the sea roar, and the fulness thereof.
12Let the field be joyful, and all that is therein: then shall all the trees of the wood rejoice
13Before the LORD: for he cometh, for he cometh to judge the earth: he shall judge the world with righteousness, and the people with his truth.

6With trumpets and sound of cornet make a joyful noise before the LORD, the King.
7Let the sea roar, and the fulness thereof; the world, and they that dwell therein.
8Let the floods clap their hands: let the hills be joyful together
9Before the LORD; for he cometh to judge the earth: with righteousness shall he judge the world, and the people with equity.

Seems to be an awful lot of anthropomorphizing going on here: rejoicing heavens, roaring seas, applauding floods. Still, it’s effective: I imagine crashing waves and swaying trees, and feel I know what it is like for nature to “rejoice before the LORD.” But then comes that kill-joy John Ruskin: the crashing waves just sound like applause, which is also suggested by their movement; the grain that bends in the breeze looks like it’s dancing, but it isn’t, and the susurration of stalk on stalk is most certainly not quiet song. It’s just a lot of inanimate stuff, moving randomly because of the wind or gravity or whatever, which are themselves random and animate. So, no actual rejoicing, really: just an impressionable psalmist caught up in the moment, unaware of his silliness.

But if we read these psalms in this way, what is left? If creation is not rejoicing, but instead doing a passable simulation thereof, at least for those susceptible to such crudities–do these verses say anything meaningful at all? No, if this is our hermeneutic, these verses are nothing but artful filler: there seems to be no room in Ruskin’s conception of nature for a rejoicing creation.

Perhaps, then, we ought to try another conception of nature. I’d like to take a stab at that, taking Tolkien and the psalmists as my guide. That will be the project of another day, though; and, like as not, this post will grow into a Gilmourian serial. For now, I am content if I have made our readers look uneasily at willow trees, unsure whether they will attack or rejoice.

Works Cited

Tolkien, J. R. R. The Fellowship of the Ring. London: Houghton Mifflin, 1988.

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