History

Episode #56: Civil Wars

13 September 2011

General Introduction
- Comparing offices
- What’s on the blog?
- Listener feedback
- Punching the tar baby

Absalom, Absalom!
- The roots of civil war in incest
- Popular support
- Mourning for the enemy
- (It’s “Absalon, Fili Mi,” not “Absalon, Mili Fi”)
- The Gore Vidal view of history

Rome
- Which war?
- Law vs. tyranny
- Dictatorship vs. republic
- Is the force of law enough to rule?
- Who rules the Senate?
- Building on history
- American self-invention

The English Civil War
- Monarchy vs. Parliamentary Republic
- James I defends his Imago Dei
- Milton strikes back
- James to Charles to Cromwell to Charles
- Cavaliers and Roundheads

The American Civil War
- The Revolutionary War
- Was Lincoln a tyrant or just a Federalist?
- Why the war wasn’t just about slavery
- The clash of the past and the future
- Were the Confederate generals heroes?
- Randy Newman and the geography of racism

Lingering Effects of the American Civil War
- Help us, Chris Gehrz
- A matter of time
- The English Civil War in popular culture
- Sic Semper Tyrannis!

American Policy and Foreign Civil Wars
- Bad-faith rhetoric
- Why civil wars sometime require intervention
- The role of religion
- Intervention based on president

The Christian Response
- Sons of Cain
- The sword Christ brings
- The Fall
- Civil wars as the ultimate tragedy
- The beginnings of Christianity
- Nathan Gilmour offends everybody


GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Harris, Joel Chandler. The Complete Tales of Uncle Remus. Ed. Richard Chase. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2002.

Livy. The Early History of Rome. Trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt. New York: Penguin, 2002.

Milton, John. The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates. Portland, Ore.: ReadHowYouWant, 2007.

Paine, Thomas. Common Sense. New York: Penguin, 1982.

Shakespeare, William. Julius Caesar. New York: Arden, 1998.

Wilson, Harriet E. Our Nig; Or, Sketches from the Life of a Free Black in a Two-Story White House. Seattle: CreateSpace, 2011.

So I finally read Francis Schaeffer…

9 August 2011

I don’t keep count of how many times people recommend books to me (I never have the presence of mind to start the count on the first instance, and three or four in, I figure I won’t be able to keep an accurate number), but in the case of Francis Schaeffer’s How Shall We then Live?, I can remember when someone first recommended it.  I was home in Indiana on summer break from my first year at Milligan College, where I’d taken two semesters of Humanities (Milligan’s interdisciplinary history/literature/philosophy/art-history core course sequence) from a mostly-conservative English professor and two semesters of Bible survey from a moderate-to-conservative New Testament professor.  While I was talking to the owner and manager of the local Christian bookstore in Indiana about both (and noting that, as someone who was more than a little conservative, he was more than a little concerned about some of the things I was reporting to him as things I’d learned), he noted that they had a video series that I could rent (these were the days when some physical structures kept collections of VHS tapes for people to take home on a nightly-rental basis) by someone called Francis Schaeffer.  It sounded interesting, but since I was on my way back to Tennessee in a short while, I declined to rent it.  Over the years, in online and in-person contexts, several folks have recommended Schaeffer, but until this summer, fifteen years after the first recommendation, I’d never had occasion actually to buy and to read it.  Since it would be more than a bit daft to write a review of a thirty-five-year-old book, I’m going to write a bit about some of the surprises that met me and some of the questions that occurred to me as I read this much-recommended volume.

Two things stuck with me most as I finished the book.  The strangest thing about this book is its central rhetorical contradiction.  Schaeffer clearly knows that he is not writing the first cultural history of the Western tradition: by the time How Then Should We Live? hit the presses in 1976, William Fleming’s Arts and Ideas (which my college used as our art-history textbook) was more than twenty years old and in at least its fourth edition.  I note this not to say that no history is worth rewriting (that’s the point of the discipline of history, as far as I’m concerned) but to note that, when he undertook to write an arts-and-ideas sort of history, he wrote such a history with a particular perspective and for particular purposes.  I knew that’s what he was doing when he attacked Dante and Caravaggio for failing to be good Protestants, and I knew that’s what he was after when he excused the destruction of ancient artworks by over-zealous iconoclastic Protestants as the ill-informed but understandable reaction to a culture of idolatry.  Those sorts of moves, the new assignments of blame and the exoneration of old accusations, is the stuff of revisionist history (which, as Donald Kagan notes in his lectures on Thucydides, gets entirely too bad a rap), and I expect it.

When I got deeper into the book, therefore, I was more than a bit disturbed to see Schaeffer issue a rather panicked assessment of television as a cultural force.  His take was not McLuhan’s, the media-ecological project that would become the nucleus of Neil Postman’s career assault on the tube.  Instead, the television news program is the artistic vision of human beings, something perspectival:

The physical limitations of the camera dictate that only one aspect of the total situation is given.  If the camera were aimed ten feet to the left or ten feet to the right, an entirely different “objective story” might come across.

And, on top of that, the people taking the film and those editing it often to have a subjective viewpoint that enters in.  When we see a political figure on TV, we are not seeing the person as he necessarily is; we are seeing, rather, the image someone has decided we should see.  (240)

I’ll admit that I reread that passage a couple times to make sure I’d read it right.  After all, by that point in this brief book, the reader has gotten a 239-page treatment of Western cultural history as Francis Schaeffer has decided that we should see it.  And given the definite limitations of a brief book on 3000 years of history, Schaeffer’s book is a picture of an account facing physical limitations and therefore giving a partial picture.  I would not attribute such a strange disconnect to willful deception–after all, I never met Francis Schaeffer, and every account I’ve read of the person points to a person with a great concern for the truth–but I do see in this contradiction a suspicion of rhetoric that ignores its own rhetorical project.

The other oddity of the book is its reliance on underdeveloped post hoc ergo propter hoc arguments.  Over and over Schaeffer points to post-Darwinian, mechanistic accounts of human life (Skinnerian and otherwise) as resulting from the humanism of the Italian Renaissance (164 and others).  He likewise credits (without much explanation) the brutal violence of the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution, as compared to England’s almost-bloodless Glorious Revolution or the relatively subdued American Revolution, to France’s and Russia’s failures to become Protestant (124).  Beyond the grand regional generalizations to which one must consent for these to make sense, one must also agree that there are two sorts of people in the world, namely Protestants and everybody else.  That much one might be able to swallow if one’s reading of Augustine identified civitas dei with Protestantism, but even granting that, Schaeffer never accounts for historical phenomena like the large number of Lutherans that were German citizens and National Socialist party members in the thirties; the fact that the Glorious Revolution happened scarcely a generation after the brutal Civil War in England (whose regicidal faction was unmistakably Protestant); and that the ideas of the Italian Renaissance and the French/German/Swiss Reformation were scarcely easy to separate either in seventeenth-century England or in eighteenth-century America.  That Schaeffer finds Protestant theology more faithful than Catholic or that Schaeffer thinks that certain ideas make other ideas more plausible I can applaud; that he makes complex historical events the simplistic results of sectarian differences I have a harder time with.

Still, several pleasant surprises made this book a fun read.  Although, in the waning years of the Cold War, he’s careful never to issue criticisms of “Capitalism,” Schaeffer does exhibit a nuanced sense of the dangers of economic ideologies, naming “the lack of a compassionate use of accumulated wealth” (114, 116, among others) as a genuine systematic problem that even Protestant regions face and advocating, among other things, universal state health care (116) as policies that only an atheistic/social-Darwinian ideology could imagine opposing.  (I wonder whether the prominent GOP pundits who blurbed my edition of the book–published in 2005, when GOP pundits weren’t nearly as skittish about “the government”–regret that now.)  Moreover, Schaeffer names with delightful clarity why I can’t stand certain films that “the cultured” hold up as unassailable masterpieces, making the distinction between a genuine work of art, which speaks to the whole person, and a “bare philosophic, intellectual statement” (197).  Finally, Schaeffer names well, twenty-five years before such things unfolded in Washington, just how societies without a sense of what the political means, would respond to terrorism.  Such societies, Schaeffer writes, because they do not have any sense of liberty as a genuine political good, will “give up liberties” and welcome “a manipulating authoritarian government” (248) when decades of comfort get disturbed and the government promises to destroy evil (a strange promise for a government to make, as I tried to say even back in the last decade, but then again, it was the folks who recommended Schaeffer who seemed most convinced that a government could do just that).

In other words, this oft-praised book is neither an utter disappointment nor entirely convincing but, as far as my reading is concerned, an interesting possibility that didn’t quite live up to what such a project could be.  That’s nothing to sniff at, of course; I’m sure that my own writing has all of these sorts of flaws without many of its virtues, and although I try to be more forthcoming about the rhetorical quality of my own writing (and even about my own ideologies), there’s nothing here that I can name as willfully deceptive.  Granting that, I still see this book as an attempt to bite off too much subject-matter in too brief a volume, and the writing sometimes shows.  Such a brief book (not even a third of the length of Fleming’s Arts and Ideas) should stay utterly focused on the historical arc, but Schaeffer often breaks off into preacherly anecdotes that never get explained.  Moreover, sometimes the prose style entirely breaks down, most notably when Schaeffer writes about the rise of rock and roll:

This emphasis on hallucinogenic drugs brought with it many rock groups, for example, Cream, Jefferson Airplane, Grateful Dead, Incredible String Band, Pink Floyd, and Jimi Hendrix.  Most of their work was from 1965 to 1968. (170)

Whether one likes Schaeffer’s ideas or not, the syntax of this sentence, not to mention the location of Pink Floyd’s and the Grateful Dead’s main work in the mid-sixties, are hard to call anything but sloppy, and one ought not to deny such.  Even so, I do have to tip my hat to any book that mentions the Incredible String Band.  I thought the Gilmour family might be the last place that the Incredible String Band lives on, but here it is, in the textbook of a dozen evangelical colleges.  At any rate, the point here is that this book is a mixed bag of a short volume, at turns nuanced and reductionist, sometimes exhibiting the lifelong teacher’s way with words and sometimes breaking down into freshman-comp prose.  Like many such books, the sorts that get held up as cultural monuments by some and dismissed as hack-jobs by others, it’s probably a bit of both.

I suppose, fifteen years later, I can live with that.

 

I Did Not Forge This Review: A Review of Forged for HarperOne

2 March 2011

ForgedForged: Writing in the Name of God–Why the Bible’s Authors Are not who we Think they Are
By Bart Ehrman.

265 pp. $25.99 (hardcover)

Normally I don’t have to establish these sorts of things, but this book has me worried, so before I get to the book itself I want to assert these things:

  • Although writers in my contemporary era write about folks from Indiana and folks who live in Georgia as people with little interest in books and ideas, in fact I read quite well and own a number of books myself.
  • Although the vocabulary I use here differs significantly from the vocabulary I had at my command when I was eighteen and will likely reflect views on life that will have changed by the time I’m forty-eight, a thirty-three-year-old named Nathan Gilmour did in fact write this text.
  • Although I might inadvertently use metaphors here that are obscure now but might come into more common use fifty years from now (who can predict these things?), I in fact did compose this review.
  • I have on more than one occasion written a note to friends at church, family members, and other people in behalf of myself and my wife Mary, and I signed those missives “we” despite the fact that Mary did not directly choose any of the words that I used.
  • Although I grew up in Capitalist-friendly Indiana and live in Capitalist-friendly Georgia, my own suspicions of Capitalism are not superadded to my writings by a later era.  I promise.

I begin with this dumb little joke (and it is a dumb little joke) to make the point that, although Ehrman promises a scholarly monograph that will carry this little book’s arguments further, this book in itself leaves me wondering whether anything I write will ever pass as “authentic” in the near future, much less if someone discovers it centuries from now.  But I forge ahead (to use that word in a slightly older sense than Ehrman’s) nonetheless.  For the sake of brevity, this review will focus on those moments where Ehrman asserts the presence of “forgery” (in a more modern sense) in the New Testament canon, noting at this point that discussions of alleged “forgeries” in the New Testament largely end after the first 140 pages, leaving the last 120 to discuss other phenomena.  Forged has all the confidence of the Enlightenment-era anthropologist that it’s seeing through all the “tricks” that the “savages” under review use to conceal their savagery, but as far as I can tell, it doesn’t consider very often whether or not some of them are indeed tricks. The strangest part of the whole experience, for this reviewer, was the points at which Ehrman insisted upon outrage.

Peter the Illiterate?

Ehrman cites (but does not discuss at length) several studies on first-century Palestine, insisting along the way that the top specialists in ancient history cannot claim with confidence that many Palestinian Jews could understand spoken Koine Greek in which (presumably) government officials would address them, that more than one percent of rural Palestinian Jews could read the same, or that more than a fraction of a percent of Palestinian Jews could write the sort of Greek prose that constitutes 1 and 2 Peter.  Therefore, Ehrman asserts, probability points towards an illiterate Peter and thus a Peter who could not have written the epistles attributed to Peter.  (He calls this argument evidence of “forgery,” but I’ll return to the question of diachronic linguistics in a bit.)  And, to grant his point, to attribute two letters, each with a distinctive Greek style, to a man who sociologically was very unlikely to have the sort of education needed to write them, seems somewhat a strain on normal historical practices.

What Ehrman neglects, of course, is that the New Testament hardly confines itself to normal historical claims.  New Testament documents, after all, also claim that Peter walked on the surface of the Sea of Galilee without sinking into it (for a while at least); that Peter could touch lepers and heal them of their diseases; that Peter saw visions of Moses and Elijah on the top of a mountain; that Peter could speak to a multilingual crowd from all over the eastern Mediterranean world and be understood by all of them simultaneously; and that Peter was at the epicenter of more than one major earthquake, just to name a few claims that the New Testament makes on Peter’s behalf.  By the end of all that, the claim that he somehow acquired some knowledge of the Septuagint seems like a small-wager proposition by comparison.  My point here is not that Ehrman’s conclusion, that somebody other than Simon of Galilee composed the books of 1 and 2 Peter, is untenable intellectually.  Instead, I’d argue that entirely neglects on the really outrageous things that the documents of the New Testament claim for Peter, which indicates to me that he’s writing for a reader who, in approaching these documents, already assumes that such things simply cannot and therefore did not happen.  But more on the implied reader later.

Ehrman also neglects the real historical conditions that likely surrounded the last months of Saint Peter’s life.  Tradition holds that he died a martyr in Nero’s Rome, and Ehrman does not see any need to deny that.  What he ignores is that Peter was likely in prison during the months leading up to his execution and that such a prison context would allow (what strikes me as) an alternative plausible scenario for the letters’ composition, namely that Peter might have told some Greek-educated Christians (Paul’s letter to the Romans seems to indicate that they would have been present in Rome by the mid-sixties AD) what to send out to this or that church under his authority, and rather than compose them in the damp and dark of a Roman prison, those messengers might have gone to some place more suited for writing before laying out the documents we know as 1 and 2 Peter.  Ehrman seems to maintain that even such an act would have constituted “forgery” (more on that strange word later), since secretarial composition was not an accepted practice.  (Only Cicero ever explicitly mentions having a secretary compose a letter for him.)  Those things granted, given the likely circumstances (which are speculative, but so are Ehrman’s for the “forged” documents–that’s the nature of ancient history, as far as I can tell),  even the Cicero’s exiled-to-his-villa circumstances seem somewhat sanitary compared to Peter’s.  In other words, what Ehrman presents as an airtight argument from probability I see as one possibility but not the possibility that most adequately accounts for the historical moment of the real Peter’s life.  I’m still inclined to call them the letters of Peter.

Paul the Stalwart?

The sections on the Pauline epistles repeated standard, nineteenth-century arguments against Paul as the author of 2 Thessalonians, Ephesians, Colossians, 1 and 2 Timothy, and Titus.  According to these old arguments, the vocabularies in these so-called “deutero-Pauline” epistles varies significantly enough from the so-called “ortho-Pauline” letters of Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, and Philemon that they must have come from different authors.  Furthermore, go these arguments, Paul’s teachings on things like salvation, women’s roles in worship and in the home, the end of the present age, and other theologically heavy topics change enough that the same man couldn’t have written them all.  Therefore the “Deutero-Paulines” must be (and I promise I will get to this word later) “forgeries.”

For a genuinely beautiful account of Ephesians as a rival for Galatians as the center of the Pauline corpus, I recommend N.T. Wright’s book Justification: God’s Plan & Paul’s Vision. But this is not a review of Wright, so to return to the task at hand, Ehrman seems to assume that the change over time that is a commonplace in scholarship on the careers of Plato, Augustine, Shakespeare, Milton, and James Joyce, just to name a few, must not apply to the scholarship of Paul the former Pharisee.  If Paul changes the content of his ideas even so much as to add a present ethical dimension to resurrection, where before it had only a salvation-historical aspect (Ehrman locates this difference as knockdown evidence that Ephesians has gotten the vocabulary of 1 Corinthians wrong), Ehrman cries, “Forgery!”  I’m more inclined to think that Paul might have had some time to think in all those prison cells, that perhaps a more nuanced and ethically shaded use of the vocabulary is just what I’d expect from a writer who is dealing with a cosmically novel phenomenon in his writing over the course of several years. And given that, in his own words and in the words of Acts, one of the changes that he underwent somewhere in his public career involves a switch from being a sacerdotal bounty hunter, dragging Christians in to the authorities in Jerusalem, to being the most recognized evangelist to the Gentiles across the whole Mediterranean basin, I’m inclined to treat other changes that occur over the course of his career as small wagers as well.

Of course, it’s not necessary to posit existential changes in most cases.  As Christian ethicists have been arguing for years, not only Paul’s letters but also the canonical Gospels seem to shift in emphasis based on the contingencies of the recipient communities’ common lives, so Paul is entirely within his rights to call for stable leadership in Timothy’s gathering but a more free-form (but orderly!) gathering for the Christians in Corinth, so the expectation that the entire Pauline corpus is going to be uniform and free from historical contingency is a strange one in its own right.  Although we can and should describe possible reasons for those differences, there aren’t too many good reasons to cry “forgery!” without some sense that someone before the German high modernists might have called foul first.

With regards to the stylistic changes, I imagine my own prose 15 years ago and my own prose 15 years hence will likely differ from one another given the strangeness of human existence, but I discussed that, along with the possibility that Paul’s imprisonment might have been a factor, in my section on Peter.  As with those documents, I’m still inclined to call the Pauline epistles the letters of Paul.

Tricky Bart

Never once did I doubt Ehrman’s seriousness about exploring trickery in ancient literature, for Ehrman himself is no mean practitioner of rhetorical sleight of hand.  As he alerts readers to the signs that this or that document might be a “forgery,” he neglects to note that the word “forgery” itself has a history that largely begins in the age of the printing press.  Although he notes that “forgery” was not a crime in the ancient world as it has become in the last 600 years, and although he does briefly note the terminology that a small sample of ancient authors used when talking about falsely attributed texts, he proceeds to call all sorts of documents “forgeries” throughout the book, no doubt to carry the modern, criminal-law rhetorical weight of the term into his discussions of various Christian documents, most notably (and most faithfully to the book’s subtitle) certain New Testament books.  Every time that word appears, even though Ehrman never discusses the distinctively modern sense of the word beyond calling it a “crime,” the reader is reminded, because of the reader’s situation in a print culture, of a class of criminal acts in which a falsely printed and signed document can be used as a means to implicate a victim of a crime or to defraud a victim of money or property.  Ehrman never has to paint a picture of some underaged second-century Christian’s using a fake ID marked “Saul of Tarsus” to get into a bar; the word “forgery,” for literate readers of English, already carries the rhetorical freight of a particular sort of crime.  In the case of 2 Thessalonians, Ehrman calls it a “forgery” at least six times before ever coming to discuss the book’s contents or to offer an argument that some sort of false attribution is going on, much less to establish the adequacy of the modern-era use of “forgery” to describe that false attribution.  He calls second-century Gnostic documents “forgeries” with the same fluency with which he names nineteenth-century bestsellers “forgeries” without ever slowing down to wonder, as a good lawyer might, whether differences in intent, means, and results warrant the use of the same term to name both ranges of phenomena.

What’s more, each of Ehrman’s chapters that ends with a discussion of New Testament material begins with not with the New Testament but with texts that (according to Ehrman’s own dating) come well after the New Testament, only to return to canonical writings at the end of the discussion.  The rhetorical effect is to establish an atmosphere of chuckling incredulity in place before the reader gets to the New Testament.  In the stories of the later texts, Ehrman often includes a brief narrative about the definitive moment when the world caught the forger.  No such story is available for the New Testament texts, but nonetheless, the warm-up act is notable for someone looking at Ehrman’s own rhetorical moves.  Not to dwell on such things, Ehrman also tends to pick poorly-worded critiques of his ideas and pick them apart, then provide a glowing attributive phrase and then one footnote for an entire book in moments when an appeal to authority suits his purposes.

Such a range of rhetorical moves is important to a reader like me because part of Ehrman’s own claim is that anachronisms are certain signs that something fishy is going on, and since in the introduction Ehrman claims to be “interested in the truth” (11), I suspected early in the book that something other than journalistic reporting was going on with his incessant insistence on the word “forgery” to name phenomena that occur, by and large, at least a thousand years before that word took on its modern sense.  And since the arguments that he does marshal for calling certain documents false attributions (though he never does argue for the particular modern term he uses for them) have their roots in nineteenth-century German high modernism, his rhetorical razzle-dazzle really is the main show in this book. Unfortunately, what Ehrman’s book lacks in new Biblical Studies scholarship it doesn’t really make up for in new means of convincing the unconvinced that Christians are as immoral and gullible as he wants to call us: his transparent misuse of “forgery,” his arrangement of material, and the juxtaposition of personal anecdotes about lying with discussions of old Biblical scholarship are the same old things that I’ve been seeing since The God Delusion. If anything, this is the same sort of atheism-on-the-cheap that someone like Richard Dawkins peddles, only Ehrman’s isn’t as convincing.  And that’s saying something.

If every book has its ideal reader, I’m fairly certain I’m not Bart Ehrman’s ideal reader.   Forged seems pitched at those folks who have had a semester of Introduction to Religion and want a bit of extra water-cooler ammunition and a few snappy jokes for those encounters with evangelicals at work and at school.  Good writers explain certain chains of reasoning to anticipate the objections of certain kinds of writers, and Ehrman obviously lacks the will to make a case that anything but an Enlightenment-style closed material universe is governing the phenomena surrounding the composition and canonization of the New Testament and the failure of other documents to become canon.  That’s not a crime, of course: every book can’t be for every reader.  Those omissions probably will not bother the sort of reader who reads Dawkins and Ehrman for pleasure, which returns me once more to my sorrowful confession: although I did write this review in 2011, and although as far as I know nobody will see fit to attribute texts to me when I’m dead and gone, the writer who now types with his own fingers finds this book a nice illustrative example of what post-September-11 anti-Christian publishing looks like but not much more.

[N.B. This review is based on an advance copy of the book that I received for review purposes.  HarperOne provided the book at no charge to me, and that fact did not, as far as I know, affect my review of the book.]

The Christian Humanist Podcast, Episode #39: Town and Country

8 February 2011

General Introduction
- New segment: Michial Farmer’s world of women’s fashion
- Thanks for not writing in
- Why Nathan is the left-leaner amongst us
- What’s on the blog?

Aesop Ipsa Loquitur
- Is the country mouse a rube?
- Other Greek notions about the polis
- Plato’s suburban pharmacy
- The importance of human contact

Contrasting the Hebrew Perspective
- Cities and corruption
- Solomon’s urban fervor
- That curséd wilderness
- Garden as Hebraic ideal
- Gilgamesh civilizes the wild man
- Moses goes out beyond the boundary of imagination

The New Testament and the Early Church
- Christ the vagrant
- Equal-opportunity parables
- Augustine and Rome
- The heretical countryside

The Middle Ages and The Renaissance
- Churches and urban centers
- The origins of pagan
- Snookering-slash-correcting the rubes
- Langland gets sympathetic
- A new kind of pastoral
- London as hell

The Romantics
- Hegel and the city
- The Romantics fight back
- The country laborer and the university Marxist
- The rise of industrialization

America!
- The errand to the wilderness
- Puritan commerce
- The early decay of Boston
- Continual westward expansion
- Sister Carrie’s ambiguous ending
- The urban pushback and the abandonment of small towns
- Make the noise stop, please

The Cynical Midcentury
- The suburbs take over the shire
- The American dream gets transplanted
- American re-creation
- The stultifying suburbs
- Farmer on On the Road
- The vanishing rural
- All God’s children are terrible

The Takeaway
- Automobile culture
- But let’s not romanticize
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aesop. Fables. Trans. Laura Gibbs. New York: Oxford UP, 2008.

Anderson, Sherwood. Winesburg, Ohio. Ed. Charles E. Modlin and Ray Lewis White. New York: Norton, 1995.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. W.D. Ross. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1984. 1729-1867.

Augustine. City of God. Trans. Henry Bettenson. New York: Penguin, 2003.

Blake, William. Poetry and Designs. Ed. John E. Grant and Mary Lynn Johnson. New York: Norton, 2007.

Bunker, Nick. Making Haste from Babylon: The Mayflower Pilgrims and Their World: A New History. New York: Knopf, 2010.

Chaucer, Geoffrey. The Canterbury Tales. Ed. V.A. Kolve and Glending Olson. New York: Norton, 2005.

Dreiser, Theodore. Sister Carrie. New York: Oxford UP, 2009.

The Epic of Gilgamesh. Trans. Andrew George. New York: Penguin, 2003.

Faulkner, William. The Sound and the Fury. New York: Vintage, 1991.

Felix. Life of Saint Guthlac. Trans. Bertram Colgrave. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985.

Fitzgerald, F. Scott. The Great Gatsby. New York: Scribner, 1999.

Kerouac, Jack. On the Road. New York: Penguin, 1999.

Langland, William. Piers Plowman. Ed. Elizabeth Ann Robertson and Stephen H.A. Shepherd. New York: Norton, 2006.

Milton, John. Paradise Lost. New York: Norton, 2004.

O’Connor, Flannery. The Complete Stories. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1971.

—. Wise Blood. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.

Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. Christopher Rowe. New York: Penguin, 2005.

Roth, Henry. Call It Sleep. New York: Picador, 2005.

Sidney, Philip. The Major Works. New York: Oxford UP, 2009.

Tolkien, J.R.R. The Lord of the Rings. New York: Mariner, 2005.

Twain, Mark. Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. New York: Norton, 1998.

Updike, John. Rabbit, Run. New York: Knopf, 1996.

Wordsworth, William. Selected Poems. Ed. Stephen Gill. New York: Penguin, 2005.

This Week in Links

5 November 2010

Economic Reality and Gospel Proclamation: A Response to “The Just One Challenge”

21 October 2010

“The Just One Challenge” from The Christian Standard

Perhaps this little essay will not sustain the interest of any but those who are involved with the Stone-Campbell tradition, those congregations that often go by geographical names along with “Christian Church.”  My hope, however, is that in reflecting on an anxiety within my own tradition, some interesting theological questions might arise even for those of the Christian Humanist’s readers who only know the Restoration Movement because of my participation in it.

First, let me go ahead and congratulate those of you who read through the article and found the obvious idiosyncrasies and bits of narrow vision to which my tradition is especially susceptible.  Yes, the article seems to assume that only the evangelicals in France count as Christians.  And yes, the working assumption seems to be that only Bible-college graduates are going to be in the world to communicate the particulars of the Christian faith to all those who are not Christians.  And yes, the pronouns are all masculine.  Although there’s been debate within my tradition since the 1890′s about women ministers, and even though some of our congregations have women ministers, some writers for our publications still assume an all-male clergy.

All of that out of the way, what troubles me most about this article is the assumption that the independent-Christian-church congregation, itself somewhat of an innovation of the last two hundred years, automatically stands as the form that will best sustain the preaching of the Gospel in the years to come and that, as a result, what the current members of those congregations should be most concerned to do is make sure that enough youngsters commit their higher educational careers to sustaining that model.

My first concern with such assumptions is purely empirical.  I’ve heard many an old-time preacher (and I love me some old-time preachers, most especially my own father-in-law) say that there’s a shortage of young preachers, but the (shrinking) job listings, at least within my own tradition, tell a story that differs somewhat from the scarcity narrative.  Most if not all of the listings for preachers assume that they can demand someone with church-work experience, that they can set in very precise terms what sort of education the candidates should bring, and that they can set forth at the outset what sort of intellectual/doctrinal/theological frameworks are in and which are out.  In other words, the job listings seem to proceed from a position of power, assuming that they’re not sending up a distress beacon so much as sifting through a bounty of potential preachers.

Furthermore, the “scarcity” story does not adequately describe the wildly different experiences of smaller churches or larger churches whose preachers and elders I’ve spoken with.  For the medium-to-mega-churches, any job listing that offers a living wage, so I’ve heard, will get anywhere between thirty and a hundred applicants.  And for smaller churches, whose offering plates don’t yield up enough to support a family without a second job, it’s hard to get even one, especially when the graduates of the more conservative colleges expect to make enough money to keep their wives at home on one salary.  In other words, the “shortage” might well have to do with the sizes of congregations just as much as it has to do with an absolute arithmetic lack of professionals in the field.

Beyond the job listings, of course, I have my own experience.  About six years ago, when I was contemplating what to do with my life after completing my second graduate degree (one in Old Testament, one in English literature), one step I took was to apply to a number of associate and preaching minister jobs in Stone-Campbell congregations.  I worked up a good resume, wrote my share of application letters, and in all contacted twelve churches inquiring after their jobs.  (It seemed like a good number.)  At the time I had preached somewhere around sixty Sunday-morning sermons (more than a graduating Bible college senior likely has preached), I had some proficiency in Greek and Hebrew, and I had credentials from two very respected Stone-Campbell schools (Milligan College and Emmanuel School of Religion) leading off my resume.  I also had two and a half years’ teaching experience in college classrooms, a strength that I highlighted for congregations looking for a preacher who could also educate adults in classroom settings.  In the months that followed my sending out the applications, precisely one of the twelve churches ever even contacted me, and that was a two-line email to inform me that I wasn’t what they were looking for.  In the meantime I applied for and gained admission into the University of Georgia’s Ph.D in English program.  I’d like to think that such a move turned out well.

The bottom line is that, from what I’ve heard and from what I’ve seen, the narrative that this article presents, one in which opportunities for those trained only as traditional paid clergy are expanding more quickly than are the numbers of people qualified to be paid clergy, does not seem to be adequate to the realities inside of which actual churches do what they do.

I want to make two things perfectly clear.  For one, I do believe in and honor divine vocation: those whom God calls to preach must preach.  I also must be clear on a second point, namely that that the paid pastor of the local independent congregation is a new arrival on the historical scene, not something that has always been with the Church and not something without which Christ’s Church will perish. Even a cursory survey of church history will turn up Paul, who worked as a tent-maker; friars, who begged from town to town as they preached; celibate secular clergy in the middle ages, whose expenses were kept low by keeping them from (legitimately) supporting children; and the modern movement of bi-vocational ministry among evangelical Protestants.

What the old-time preachers neglect (and remember, I love me some old-time preachers) is that economic realities change over the course of the Church’s history.  The pensioned parish parson is a figure that makes perfect sense in the Church of England when and where said Church is in a place of cultural prominence, and the paid pastor still has some currency in congregations large enough to support that pastor on roughly two percent of the congregation’s income.  (And yes, I know preachers want ten percent.  I also know that the reality is closer to two percent.)  But to tell this generation of young and pious youth group kids that the only faithful course in the world is to specialize in a profession that’s becoming narrower by the year is something akin to encouraging scads of people to do grad school in the humanities.  (And I say this as someone who’s sitting in an English professor’s office and who looks at an English professor in the mirror in the mornings.)  The number of churches that can support a preacher, much less a staff of ordained clergy, is shrinking, and if people really want to reach out to human beings anywhere but in the wealthy suburbs, bivocational preachers or some kind of new-monastic life of simplicity seems to be the way to go.

I realize that the purists among the old-time preachers will likely consider me a sell-out of sorts for writing this, but I do think that Bible colleges, if they want to be responsible as they train the next generation of gospel-proclaimers, should do so by combining a rigorous education in Biblical languages, Biblical interpretation, Church history, and other practices of the theological intellect with training as English teachers, accountants, auto mechanics, and other skilled professions.  (Not all of them need start with vowels.)  And to be perfectly honest, I don’t think that one person has enough hours in a week faithfully do both and raise a family.  For that reason (and because I think it’s a good idea on other theological grounds), I do think that the future of the church will not be with one person in a suit (or a robe, if your tradition is into that) in a pulpit every Sunday morning but with a plurality of teaching elders, sharing the responsibilities of teaching as congregations shoulder the burdens as their lives allow to care for the sick, visit the lonely, and do other things that really ought to be duties distributed among the congregation rather than heroically shouldered by the dude with the Clergy pass at the hospital.

This will require a new array of strategies for training, placing, and otherwise moving future preachers along to where gathered Christians need them, I realize, and off the top of my head, I don’t have any ideas that I’m comfortable writing yet.  But having spent time in the poorer parts of a medium-sized city with a bivocational preacher whom I still hold up as my own model for Church ministry, and having spent some time in poorer parts of non-urban America, where job listings for preachers simply do not yield many good applications, and having spent some time in congregations that struggle to make ends meet, I do happen to think that imagining such strategies should be the business of those people who research, theorize, and write books about living as the church.  And while I’m not out to get any old-time preachers fired, I do wonder just how many traditionally trained old-time preachers would go to waste twenty years from now when a new generation of truck-mechanic-preachers, store-manager-preachers, and computer-programmer-preachers could be reaching rural America, the poor sections of the small cities, and all of those other population groups that can’t really support a Saddleback or a Southeast Christian.  I’m not by any means anti-preacher; I just wonder how much better our preachers could be going forth when the demographics aren’t confining them to the suburbs.

As usual, I do welcome our readers’ feedback, both those from the Stone-Campbell movement and from elsewhere, about whether I’m missing some important reality or if my suggestion makes some sense.  What do you see as the future of Bible-college, Christian-college, and seminary education?

The Christian Humanist Podcast, Episode #28: Kings

20 September 2010

General Introduction
- Listener feedback: In which Michial takes offense at compliments
- What’s on the blog?
- A notice about next week

King David
- What picture does the Hebrew Bible give us of monarchy?
- The transition from judges to kings
- God’s rejection of Saul
- Heightism in ancient Israel
- A tale of two Lord’s anointeds
- Bad news for the bearers of bad news
- Kingly duties (haha, he said “doodies”)
- David’s mercenary army
- Zeus and the frogs

Greek Kings
- Smaller kings with less power
- Why was Agamemnon in charge, anyway?
- Does kingship follow religion?

The City That Would Have No King
- Why did the Romans hate kings?
- The real or mythical Tarquins
- Brutus plays dumb
- Night-wandering weasels
- A funny thing happened on the way to the Senate…

A New Kind of Kingship
- The King of the Jews
- On the Jewish Messiah
- Jesus thrown everything off balance
- Christ and politics: A preview of a future episode
- The new spiritual kingship
- Mark Antony and Herod the Great

Medieval Kings
- Charlemagne’s other nickname
- Packing a rod in the Germanic world
- David speaks Old English
- Ring-givers and gold friends
- The Phony King of England
- Who died and made you king?
- We skip the Renaissance

American Rejection of Monarchy
- We just hate George III
- The roots of the revolution
- The Adams/Jefferson mudslinging
- Democracy and American literature
- Ah, but we digress: Colonial myths
- Update: It was Samuel Adams, which is at least less ridiculous: http://www.glennbeck.com/content/articles/article/198/37933/

Pop Cultural Kings
- The Sultan of Swat
- Jack Kirby, the King of Comics
- THE KING
- King Richard

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aesop. Fables. Trans. Laura Gibbs. New York: Oxford UP, 2008.

Beowulf. Trans. Seamus Heaney. New York: Norton, 2001.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Essays and Lectures. Ed. Joel Porte. New York: Library of America, 1982.

Homer. The Iliad. Trans. E.V. Rieu. New York: Penguin, 2003.

Livy, Titus. The Early History of Rome. Trans. Aubrey de Selincourt. New York: Penguin, 2002.

McCullough, David. John Adams. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009.

Paine, Thomas. Common Sense. New York: Penguin, 1982.

Shakespeare, William. Julius Caesar. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005.

—. The Poems. Ed. John Roe. Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 2006.

Book Review: “Making Haste from Babylon”

29 July 2010

Making Haste from Babylon: The Mayflower Pilgrims and Their World
By Nick Bunker
Illustrated. 489 pp. Alfred A. Knopf. $30.00.

Two eras of American history seem to be of perpetual interest to readers: the Revolutionary War and the Puritan epoch. Our attraction to the former stems, I think, from our desire both to emulate the bravery of the Founding Fathers and to claim them for our own political ends. We study the Puritans for the opposite reason: We want to avoid making what we view as their mistakes. (There are exceptions to this general rule, of course. Certain members of the religious right admire the Puritans as much as the Revolutionaries; and neo-Calvinists likely admire them more.)

Each year brings a new surge of books attempting to supply us with a new angle on what is a very familiar story, albeit one that has been so heavily mythologized that the average layman would not recognize the truth if he were transported back to the 1620s. Proper history must defuse the convenient and attractive myth; until that happens, further books on the Puritans will be necessary.

The latest book of this sort is Nick Bunker’s Making Haste from Babylon: The Mayflower Pilgrims and Their World. The subtitle–appealing, no doubt, to fans of Brian McLaren–reads “A New History,” a claim that is simultaneously true and false. Bunker gives us much that is new (though he also repeats debunkings that earlier scholars have already performed), but it’s rather misleading to refer to this book as “a history” of anything. Rather, the phrase “and Their World” provides a more accurate summary of the book’s contents. Making Haste contains multitudes and would be more accurately subtitled “New Histories,” for Bunker does his best to discuss everything that went into the voyage of the Mayflower and the founding of Plymouth Plantation. As is so often the case, this expansiveness is both the book’s major strength and the termite that threatens to chew through its foundation.

Among the topics Bunker covers in Making Haste: the comet of 1618; King James’s obsession with health and illness; the Royal Chapel at Whitehall; the geography of Englands Old and New (many, many times); the importance of the beaver hat to 17th-century fashion; Robert Browne, the notorious Separatist; and a violent earthquake that shook England in 1580. All of these topics can inform our understanding of the Mayflower Pilgrims, of course, but most of them could serve as books in their own right, and Bunker’s narrative is continually in danger of collapsing under the collective weight of his diversions.

Much of this danger would be alleviated if Bunker had a clear thesis beyond “Here’s what happened to the Pilgrims,” but most of the time the book feels scattershot. He will return from an excursion in the informational wilderness long enough to discuss Plymouth for a few pages, before heading right back out again. Occasionally he will even jump from diversion to diversion without going back to the Puritans at all, as when he begins a discussion on “The Entrails of the King,” only to immediately head down another rabbit hole: “But before we venture into the depths of his mind, there is a story of surfaces to be told” (150). One closes the book with an image of Russian nesting dolls, a never-ending series of progressively more arcane topics.

The problem with my criticism is that the way Bunker’s book proceeds is, to the best of my knowledge, the way history as a discipline proceeds. (Disclaimer: I’ve never studied history in a professional or an academic way, aside from the two American history courses I took as an undergraduate and the dozen or so history books I’ve read in my capacity as a literary scholar, so if a professional historian reads this and wishes to correct my misconceptions about her field–well, much obliged.) History is by its nature interconnected; to learn one thing properly, one must learn every subject that touches it. So forth and so on, until you’re stuck in a mise-en-abyme, a house of mirrors with no exit. One solution to the problem is to pretend the interconnectedness doesn’t exist. This is how we end up with the so-called “whiggish histories” that propagate the oversimplified myths that in turn clal our for intentional complication, such as we find in Making Haste from Babylon.

What I look for in a history book, then, is the treacherous middle ground. The author must acknowledge the dizzying complications of his discipline–he must stay true to the real world–but he also must make cosmos from the chaos of his materials–he must stay true to the reader. The historian’s task is to draw a narrative where there exist only multiple narratives; the reader of history’s task is to read different accounts of the same events, in order to turn the monolithic myths of her primary school back into the twists and contradictions of real life. But it is very much a two-person job, and both reader and writer must confess to each other their finiteness; that is, they must admit that they cannot possibly cover it all.

This has rapidly turned into the sort of book review I hate, the review that talks about everything in the world except the book at hand. So let’s return to Bunker, who, though he’s bitten off a bit more than he can chew, nevertheless opens up some very interesting aspects of a story most Americans believe themselves to be familiar with. Bunker suggests early on that his being an Englishman gives him a new perspective on things, that heretofore English historians

have done what the Pilgrims did not do, and left America to the Americans. This is why so much of the Pilgrim narrative remains in shadowy monochrome, like a photograph in sepia, or a silent film, deprived of color, light, and sound. (5)

And indeed, this reviewer, at least, learned much that he did not know, most of it taking place on the other side of the Atlantic. Bunker is fastidious in sifting through 16th- and 17th-century records, which he uses as much as or more than he uses canonical histories like William Bradford’s Of Plimoth Plantation. (When he takes a Pilgrim’s side, incidentally, it is usually Bradford’s–and if he disagrees with the governor from time to time, most often he goes a pretty long way toward vindicating Bradford’s opinions.)

By far, Bunker’s most interesting discovery is the role of the beaver in the survival of the Plymouth Colony. Our national story on the Puritans is that they sailed from England to find something abstract like “religious freedom.” Bunker doesn’t disagree, and he spends dozens, maybe hundreds, of pages discussing the theological positions and religious context of the Puritans. But he does add an economic motivation.

As is well-known, the Pilgrims did not leave England and immediately head to the New World. The original plan was for them to live unmolested in the Dutch city of Leiden, a textile powerhouse and world city on the make that Bunker memorably compares to “Chicago in 1890 . . . a new metropolis with the same extremes of inequality, the same volatile politics, and a religious divide” (213). But religion does not seem to have been the major problem for the English refugees in Leiden. Rather, they came to the city and found it exceedingly dangerous for the working classes and especially for immigrants. Leiden was a closed economic system:

In Leiden, wealth and influence belonged to very few. More than half the city’s property was owned by a narrow class of no more than 250 people, led the brewers and overseas merchants. . . . No Englishman could penetrate the clique of oligarchs who ran the towns, and neither could most of the Dutch. (216)

In the 1610s, Leiden was, like the rest of Europe, sliding toward recession, and things were starting to get ugly. Bunker points out that, of the four reasons Bradford gives for leaving Leiden, theology comes last. More important “was what he called ‘the hardness of ye place’: poor conditions, endless work, and a harsh diet” (219). The New World was thus an opportunity for economic rebirth.

The North American beaver, in Bunker’s estimation, is as responsible as any other factor for the survival of the Mayflower colony. He reveals the surprising fact that

At the peak of their activity, in the 1630s, the Mayflower Pilgrims sent more than two thousand beaver belts home to England . . . Without the fur trade, the colony would have failed, and the name of the ship would have faded into oblivion. (233)

The author admits that he is just exapnding on a reference Bernard Bailyn made half a century ago to the importance of the fur trade to the Puritan colony in Massachusetts–and yet his exploration of the subject carries the weight of new revelation because he is, he claims, the first historian since Bailyn to discuss this aspect of the settlement. Determining whether this claim is true is beyond my ability, but I had certainly never heard this part of the story before reading Making Haste from Babylon.

The irony is delicious and unsettling. The Puritans, known above all else for their renunciation of worldly decadence–this is the sect, after all, who banned all visual art from their churches and who stereotypically wear drab outfits of black and gray–were kept alive by selling beaver pelts back to the country they’d left. The pelts had only one use: They were made into beaver hats, luxury items that were the biggest status symbols of the mid-17th century. Some idea of their symbolic value to the era can be gleaned from the fact that Bunker quotes Coco Chanel in order to explain them.

He also discusses two English chapeliers, Richard and Samuel Arnold, noting that while “Later historians have often portrayed Puritan merchants as troubled souls, afflicted by an inner conflict between religion and the stress of conflict[,] this does not seem to have worried men such as the Arnolds” (235). Maybe not–but I would have liked to have heard about how Bradford and the other Mayflower Puritans walked this fine line, proclaiming a simple lifestyle while selling objects that inspired tremendous envy and vanity. As it is, Bunker hints at a complex dialectic of sin and economics, then leaves it for the theologians to untangle.

If there were a unifying thread to the histories Bunker weaves together in Making Haste from Babylon, it would be the role of the beaver, which he brings up many times and discusses at length in at least two chapters. But it’s not enough to provide a unified thesis for this messy, ambitious book, carved up by rabbit trails. This is apparently Bunker’s first book, and it’s not without either interest or promise. But here’s hoping that his next effort will present a better balance of order and multiplicity.