Monthly Archives: October 2010

Hitting the Links

29 October 2010

The Broken Mystery and the Deus Obliviscitus

28 October 2010

Edgar Allan Poe invented the detective story with “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” but was already bored with the genre a year later, when he published its sequel, “The Mystery of Marie Rogêt.” C. Auguste Dupin wraps up his first murder case rather neatly, and if modern readers’ knowledge of zoology renders that ending scientifically unsatisfactory in retrospect, we are still inclined to admire its aesthetic elegance. Certainly it paves the way for Arthur Conan Doyle’s delightful Sherlock Holmes cases, whose solutions are nearly always handed gingerly to the reader, wrapped up like a Christmas gift. Detective stories, quite often, are the theodicies of rationalist atheists: The reader is faced with a world of confusion and death, before being assured that an extraordinary intellect can untangle the strings and right the world’s wrongs.

Is it any wonder that the genre’s popularity boomed after the first World War, when global confusion was on the rise and faith in traditional religion was on the wane? Agatha Christie, a recent New Yorker article alleges, chose the mystery genre primarily because she was nearly guaranteed that a detective novel would be published. The Western world, clearly, was hungry for the assurances of order these novels provided. In many ways, the detective in fiction is a perfect distillment of the values of the Modern era: He is witty, rational, and able to see through layers of deceit with relative ease. The detective protagonist is how twentieth-century man imagines himself in his more self-flattering moments: urbane and cool, with faith in no one but himself. It should come as no surprise that Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir were voracious readers of detective novels, even before film noir changed the game; mystery fiction portrayed the world the way an intellectual atheist at the time would want it to be. (The Catholic detective fiction of G.K. Chesterton and Dorothy L. Sayers is more reaction to the genre than participation in it.)

By the time of Christie’s greatest popularity, however, the formula had grown stale. One of the deepest pleasures of the Holmes stories is trying to figure out the answer to the mystery before Doyle reveals it outright. Christie makes such ratiocination nearly impossible: Her endings often seem to come out of nowhere, with a trail of clues so hidden that a bloodhound couldn’t sniff them out. The famous twist ending of Murder on the Orient Express–which I will not reveal here on the off chance that one of our readers doesn’t already know it–is one of the more obvious examples, but her novels are full of unguessable solutions, some of them of the “wallbanger” variety. Hercule Poirôt and Miss Marples, Christie seems to be saying, are much better than the rest of us, and the world is such a twisted mess that only they can make sense of it–the reader doesn’t have a prayer. This style of detective fiction is not without its charms, but it’s frustrating in a way that Holmes isn’t.

Film noir, and its literary cousin, the so-called “hardboiled” detective novel, provided a much-needed shock to the genre’s system. The stylistic differences are immediately apparent to everyone–Sam Spade is cynical and vulgar in a way that Holmes would never be–but the actual substance of the mysteries is different, too. The noir protagonist is lost from page one, or the opening credits, and the more he thinks he understands, the more lost he gets. This is especially true in the writings of Raymond Chandler, who perfected the hardboiled novel at about the same time as he put Los Angeles on the map as a place worth describing in literary fiction. There’s probably no twentieth-century American more responsible for blurring the boundaries between high and low art than Chandler, who was educated in the finest schools in England but returned to the States to write about dames, cigarettes, and crooked police departments.

The mystery is rather beside the point in Chandler’s novels. According to Hollywood legend, William Faulkner was writing the screenplay for The Big Sleep when he ran across a problem. “Who killed the chauffeur?” he asked. Chandler was forced to admit that he didn’t know either. The story is funny but telling: the whodoneit(s) at the center of Chandler’s novels take a backseat to the books’ overall mood, which is superb. As an example, I quote what is possibly the finest moment in Chandler’s career, taken from The Little Sister, a rather poorly plotted late-period novel:

I drove east on Sunset but I didn’t go home. At La Brea I turned north and swung over to Highland, out over Cahuenga Pass and down to Ventura Boulevard, past Studio City and Sherman Oaks and Encino. There was nothing lonely about this trip. There never is on that road. Fast boys in stripped-down Fords shot in and out of the traffic streams, missing fenders by a sixteenth of an inch, but somehow always missing them. Tired men in dusty coupes and sedans winced and tightened their grip on the wheel and ploughed on north and west towards home and dinner, an evening with the sports page, the blatting of the radio, the whining of their spoiled children and the gabble of their silly wives. I drove on past the gaudy neons and the false fronts behind them, the sleazy hamburger joints that look like palaces under the colors, the circular drive-ins as gay as circuses with the chipper hard-eyed car-hops, the brilliant counters, and the sweaty greasy kitchens that would have poisoned a toad. Great double trucks rumbled down over Sepulveda from Wilmington and San Pedro and crossed towards the Ridge Route, staring up in low-low from the traffic lights with a growl of lions in the rain.

Behind Encino an occasional light winked from the hills through thick trees. The homes of screen stars. Screen stars, phooey. The veterans of a thousand beds. Hold it, Marlowe, you’re not human tonight.

The air got cooler. The highway narrowed. The cars were so few now that the headlights hurt. The grade rose against chalk walls and at the top a breeze, unbroken from the ocean, danced casually across the night.

I ate dinner at a place near Thousand Oaks. Bad but quick. Feed ‘em and throw ‘em out. Lots of business. We can’t bother with you sitting over your second cup of coffee, mister. You’re using money space. See those people over there behind the rope? They want to eat. Anyway they think they have to. God knows why they want to eat here. They could do better home out of a can. They’re just restless. Like you. They have to get the car out and go somewhere. Sucker-bait for the racketeers that have taken over the restaurants. Here we go again. You’re not human tonight, Marlowe. . . .

I smelled Los Angeles before I got to it. It smelled stale and old like a living room that had been closed too long. But the colored lights fooled you. The lights were wonderful. There ought to be a monument to the man who invented neon lights. Fifteen stories high, solid marble. There’s a boy who really made something out of nothing.

This chapter is five pages of Chandler’s railing against his adopted hometown, a takedown so devastating that every pop-cultural critique of The Golden State from “Hotel California” to The Player owes an enormous debt to it. And none even comes close to matching it. Chandler’s words thrust the reader into the long-vanished Los Angeles of the 1940s; they remind us that the city has been a cesspool of gaudiness and corruption since long before the current debates over immigration, the recent budget crunch, and the reign of the Governator.

The corruption that surrounds Philip Marlowe is theologically significant; it suggests, perhaps, the Total Depravity of Calvinism, but Chandler lacks Calvin’s belief in a sovereign and benevolent God. In Chandler’s last completed novel, Playback, Marlowe is asked if he believes in God. His response is telling: “If you mean an omniscient and omnipotent God who intended everything to be exactly the way it is, no.” His interlocutor agrees: “If God were omnipotent and omniscient in any literal sense, he wouldn’t have bothered to make the universe at all. . . . Is it blasphemy to suggest that God has his bad days when nothing goes right, and that God’s days are very, very long?”

There is little reason to suppose these words do not represent Chandler’s own views on things, nor is there anything wrong with Chandler’s using his novel to promulgate these views. And yet real atheism inside a novel is, in a manner of speaking, impossible, for every novel always already has a god in its author, an entity which stands outside of its timeline and directs its action, for better or for worse. Even a novel that exists at least in part to promote atheism–such as, let’s say, John Fowles’s The Collector, one of the bleakest and ugliest books I’ve ever read–subverts its own point, at least in the world of the novel: Fowles can be an atheist, but Miranda can’t, because Fowles is her god. He may torment her and ultimately consign her to nonexistence, but he is still her god.

And this brings us back to “The Mystery of Marie Rogêt”–and to Marlowe. Readers are likely to find Poe’s story frustrating because they are forced to spend 25-plus pages of very dense writing in pursuit of a solution that never arrives. The tale breaks off as Dupin finds a major clue (a boat that the detective claims will lead to the murderer), but the details and perpetrator of the crime are never revealed. If Poe himself knows, he’s not letting on. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that he does not know; “The Mystery of Marie Rogêt” is based on a real-life murder, that of Mary Rogers of Baltimore, whose killer or killers were never brought to justice. These events suggest not an atheistic world–after all, there is still an author who is writing about more-or-less actual events–but a world of a limited and forgetful god.

We find the same dynamic in that wonderful story about The Big Sleep. In the world of the novel and film, there is, presumably, a concrete truth about who killed the chauffeur; it’s just that that truth has been forgotten by the god of the novel, Chandler. Marlowe has the god of his universe just right: He is neither omniscient nor omnipotent, collapsing into an alcoholic haze of “very, very long,” very, very bad days. He is not so much Luther’s Deus Absconditus–there is no evidence to suggest that the god Chandler is actively hiding from his characters–as a Deus Obliviscitus, an oblivious god who cannot remember every detail of the world he has created.

No doubt there are those who would say our own world is ruled by such a god, and perhaps justifiably so. This god would be a negative version of the cold and distant watchmaker of Deism–and as that belief system collapsed into atheism sometime in the last two centuries, so would the god of the broken mystery story. But this atheism would be a million miles removed from the mechanically precise world of the nü atheists. It would be something far more interesting, an utterly incomprehensible world that never worked the way it was supposed to, a world divided between the corrupt politicians of 1940s Los Angeles and the impotent good guys like Marlowe who couldn’t help but get conked in the head every few chapters.

The Christian Humanist Podcast, Episode #31: Dogma and Doctrine

26 October 2010

This week’s theme music is “An Ecumenical Matter” by Loose Fur, from Born Again in the USA. I like instrumental themes because I don’t have to slice and dice. The clip from “Dog-Mess” Johnny Evans near the top of the show is Vigilantes of Love’s “Bethlehem Steel,” from 1995’s Blister Soul.


General Introduction

- What’s in Michial’s office?

Creeds and Confessions
- What good are they, anyway?
- The well-concealed Baptist creed
- Breaking down on the Romans Road
- That strange, strange Apostle’s Creed
- Subconscious creeds
- How denominations show their work
- No creed but Christ?
- Do creeds determine or reflect doctrine?
- Creeds as boundary lines
- The weight of the creeds

Talkin’ ‘Bout Heresy
- Connection to the Apostle’s and Nicene Creeds
- Is the word too often used or not used often enough?
- Nathan’s pragmatic definition
- Historical context
- Differences of kind and degree
- The importance of heterodoxy
- Protestant problems

Biblical Demands for Doctrine
- No to Baal; yes to resurrection
- But where’s the Trinity?
- The Scriptures as correction and instruction
- The role of narrative

Jesus and Paul
- The narrative and the proposition
- Finding the balance
- Why chronology matters
- The hippie and the senator

Systematic vs. Biblical Theology
- Where do you start?
- Where inerrancy comes in
- Double corrective
- The systematic assumption of biblical theology
- A New Kind of Abraham Lincoln
- Dialectical departments
- Harmony and difference

The Post-Denominational World
- Should we just abolish them?
- The practical need for denominations
- The rise of the megachurch
- David’s favorite pope

Is Dogma a Bad Word?
- Nathan gets etymological
- Dogma without reflection
- An ownmost faith
- Why it’s still important
- This one’s for you, Wayne Peacock
- Without doctrine there can be no conversion
- Bad faith! Bad faith! Bad faith!
- Why lack of doctrine is in itself doctrine
- The anti-binary crowd as Cowardly Lion


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bowman, Robert, Jr. Orthodoxy and Heresy. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1992.

Ehrman, Bart. God’s Problem: How the Bible Fails to Answer Our Most Important Question—Why We Suffer. New York: HarperOne, 2009.

Lindbeck, George A. The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox, 1984.

Milbank, John.  Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.

Wright, N.T. The New Testament and the People of God. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1992.

Yoder, John Howard. Preface to Theology: Christology and Theological Method. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos, 2002.

They’s Justice, and then they’s Justice: A Reflection on the Lectionary Readings for 31 October 2010

25 October 2010

Revised Common Lectionary Page for 31 October 2010 (23rd Sunday after Pentecost, Year C)

Habakkuk 1:1-4; 2:1-4 and Psalm 119:137-144Isaiah 1:10-18 and Psalm 32:1-72 Thessalonians 1:1-4, 11-12Luke 19:1-10

I have to admit that I always feel like I’m the unwelcome advocate when the phrase “social justice” comes up in Christian circles.  No matter who I’m talking to, I know that my position is going to end up odious.  For those whose piety runs towards equating Christian commitment and activism in behalf of social justice, I can’t help but appear a fatalist of sorts (though I prefer to think of it as providence rather than fate).  I do grant that some manners of governing are worse than others, and I certainly think it’s the educated Christian’s duty to be educated and to speak the truth regarding the state, but I’ve also got a deep suspicion that aligning one’s self, much less one’s God, against this or that political faction runs too much a danger of idolatry, especially when being against one faction, in America’s Manichean political arena, means allying with the other.  I prefer to be a Platonist of sorts, never ceasing to note where this or that candidate’s platform is actually promising bad things and of course never forgetting that a campaign promise is only as good as the diluted delivery later.

On the other hand, because I do think that some governments are worse than others, and that staying informed on the actual substance of governance (rather than birth certificates, tasteless remarks on television interviews, and malapropisms) is worth a Christian’s time and effort to understand, and that republics are ultimately better for my neighbors than are tyrannies, I know that I must appear entirely too “political” to others.  (Of course, Aristotle would never have understood how “political” can be an indictment, since the human being is an animal who lives as part of a polis, but I don’t expect too many people to be familiar with Aristotle.)  What these folks often ask is whether I’m saved by justice or by mercy, the implication, as I take it, being that I’m somehow in favor of one thing for myself but something entirely different, and perhaps even contradictory, for the other person.  I’ll admit that I’ve never been quick enough on my feet to ask the next, properly Socratic question, so I suppose this little essay is my attempt to do so.

The justice-or-mercy question, in my estimation (and I’m always glad to entertain that I’m wrong in my estimations–the comment bar is just below), assumes some things about reality that, in my estimation, are bad assumptions.  Two categories that theologians use when they talk about being (or Being, if you’re German) are univocal and analogous.  (Some also talk about polyvocal being, but I’ve not been able to make sense of that.)  Those who are of the camp of Thomas Aquinas (like myself) tend to say that the sentences “God exists” and “God is good” and “God is love” are statements that assume analogy, in other words that God’s being is related somehow to what we mortals think of as existence, but the facts of God’s immortality and God’s omnipotence mean that the things that define (to be woodenly etymological for a second, those things that “put limits on”) our existence don’t define God’s.  And our threescore-plus-ten lives mean that what we think of as love (of the eros or of the agape varieties, really) are related to but don’t stand identical with God’s love.  And so on.  The camp that claims that being is univocal (among them Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and most popular atheist writerss of the twenty-first century) say that the sentences “God exists” and “Gilmour exists” are only different in their subjects, not their predicates.  Most (perhaps not Richard Dawkins) would then say that further true sentences about God would not be true sentences about Gilmour, but for the univocalist, predicates of existence and such are of the same type irrespective of their subjects.

Alright.  Too much history-of-theology for a Monday, you say?  Well, I do plan to do something with it, so hang in there.  I think that those who chastise the justice-seekers as hypocrites, folks who want mercy for themselves but justice for others, are reading justice univocally, and frankly, I think most iterations of this sort of mistake begin with Anselm of Canterbury.  In Anselm’s atonement theology, the punishment for sin stands in the same schema as do punishments for civil crimes, and in medieval law codes, a crime against a peasant simply does not carry the same sort of liability as does a crime against a freeman carries, and likewise for a nobleman, and supremely for a king.  Anselm, familiar as he was with the contours of criminal law, simply extrapolated upwards in this scheme of crime and punishment and held that, if the punishment for wronging a king is the death of the mortal 0body, then the punishment for wronging God must be the death of the immortal soul.  In order for the injustice of a wronged God to be righted, according to this theory, only the execution of another God could set things right.  And since there is only one person of the Trinity who could die, namely the Son, Jesus’ crucifixion on the cross becomes the solution to the eternal legal problem of a wronged God.  (Those of you who are C.S. Lewis fans should be remembering the deeply Anselmian character of the way they explain Aslan’s death in The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe.)

I have to admit that there’s some elegance in the formulation, but I do think that it relies on an assumption that the king is as different from a peasant as God is from the king, and that’s where I think univocal metaphysics miss the boat.  I’m not going to deny that penal substitutionary atonement is a valid theory of atonement (although I neither think of it as uniquely valid nor as the most adequate to Biblical revelation, but that’s for another post); what I do deny is that the radical difference between mortals and God meanders down some “chain of being” in ways that can render any calls for earthly justice hypocritical.

I hold, to the contrary, that relationships between God and mortals are metaphysically different from relationships between rulers and subjects (much less between magistrates and citizens), and because the relationship between the powerful and the weak should be one of brotherhood rather than of semi-divine magnanimity, I think that “justice” (Latin ius and Greek dikaiosyne and Hebrew mishphat, for those keeping score at home) becomes something other than justice when it’s limited only to the enforcement of contracts, tempered on occasion by the generosity of the powerful.  Certainly the Old Testament prophets were not merely calling for contract-enforcement when Isaiah condemned those who despoil widows by adding field to field and when Amos called out the predatory lenders in Samaria (and their wives, who grazed like cows on the “fields” of wealth taken from the poor).  I don’t think that any of the prophets entertained even for a moment that Israel’s sins of idol-worship would be mitigated by generosity (so put your “works-righteousness” gun away, cowboy), but because the rich and the poor are very much alike, and because the rich and God are very much unlike, the calls for divine mercy and the calls for earthly justice could come from the same mouth/pen/oracle without much of a thought that mercy and contract-enforcement were somehow contradictory poles that must be synthesized.  They were simply parts of a whole, and that whole was called mishphat, justice.

None of this lets the social-justice advocates off the hook, of course.  As I noted earlier in the post, far too often any old cause of the New Left gets baptized in the name of being not-fundamentalist, and far too little inspection and criticism happens, especially when libertarian/capitalist categories of “choice” and “rights” rather than Christian practices like hospitality and thankfulness govern Christian discourse about “issues.”  And certainly my own politics, the incorrigible Athenian democrat and Roman republican that I am, deserve scrutiny.  My point here is that the philosophical assumptions we bring to words like “salvation” and “justice” render them anything but self-evident.  In other words, this long and rambling meditation is going to end with a call for more, not less, theology.

The bottom line?  For now (until someone teaches me better), I’m going to say that what Zaccheus demonstrates in Luke 19 is not some wild antithesis to justice but the character of justice itself, returning to those defrauded what they’d lost.  I’m going to say that the forgiveness of sin that the Psalmist thanks God for in Psalm 37 is also justice itself, though of the analogical, divine-to-human sort.  And of course I’m going to say that Isaiah is no hypocrite when he calls on the people of Jerusalem to stop kidding themselves into thinking that their burnt offerings are going to satisfy a God whose call to the people is to treat one another justly, not just enforce contracts.  In other words, rather than setting up “justice” and “mercy” as dialectical poles in opposition to one another, I’d rather call both contract-enforcement and the overarching concern for the good of the least of these what the Bible calls them, simply justice.

And mercy.

And love.

May our own lives call into harmony what the world would put asunder.

The Links We Carry

22 October 2010

Economic Reality and Gospel Proclamation: A Response to “The Just One Challenge”

21 October 2010

“The Just One Challenge” from The Christian Standard

Perhaps this little essay will not sustain the interest of any but those who are involved with the Stone-Campbell tradition, those congregations that often go by geographical names along with “Christian Church.”  My hope, however, is that in reflecting on an anxiety within my own tradition, some interesting theological questions might arise even for those of the Christian Humanist’s readers who only know the Restoration Movement because of my participation in it.

First, let me go ahead and congratulate those of you who read through the article and found the obvious idiosyncrasies and bits of narrow vision to which my tradition is especially susceptible.  Yes, the article seems to assume that only the evangelicals in France count as Christians.  And yes, the working assumption seems to be that only Bible-college graduates are going to be in the world to communicate the particulars of the Christian faith to all those who are not Christians.  And yes, the pronouns are all masculine.  Although there’s been debate within my tradition since the 1890′s about women ministers, and even though some of our congregations have women ministers, some writers for our publications still assume an all-male clergy.

All of that out of the way, what troubles me most about this article is the assumption that the independent-Christian-church congregation, itself somewhat of an innovation of the last two hundred years, automatically stands as the form that will best sustain the preaching of the Gospel in the years to come and that, as a result, what the current members of those congregations should be most concerned to do is make sure that enough youngsters commit their higher educational careers to sustaining that model.

My first concern with such assumptions is purely empirical.  I’ve heard many an old-time preacher (and I love me some old-time preachers, most especially my own father-in-law) say that there’s a shortage of young preachers, but the (shrinking) job listings, at least within my own tradition, tell a story that differs somewhat from the scarcity narrative.  Most if not all of the listings for preachers assume that they can demand someone with church-work experience, that they can set in very precise terms what sort of education the candidates should bring, and that they can set forth at the outset what sort of intellectual/doctrinal/theological frameworks are in and which are out.  In other words, the job listings seem to proceed from a position of power, assuming that they’re not sending up a distress beacon so much as sifting through a bounty of potential preachers.

Furthermore, the “scarcity” story does not adequately describe the wildly different experiences of smaller churches or larger churches whose preachers and elders I’ve spoken with.  For the medium-to-mega-churches, any job listing that offers a living wage, so I’ve heard, will get anywhere between thirty and a hundred applicants.  And for smaller churches, whose offering plates don’t yield up enough to support a family without a second job, it’s hard to get even one, especially when the graduates of the more conservative colleges expect to make enough money to keep their wives at home on one salary.  In other words, the “shortage” might well have to do with the sizes of congregations just as much as it has to do with an absolute arithmetic lack of professionals in the field.

Beyond the job listings, of course, I have my own experience.  About six years ago, when I was contemplating what to do with my life after completing my second graduate degree (one in Old Testament, one in English literature), one step I took was to apply to a number of associate and preaching minister jobs in Stone-Campbell congregations.  I worked up a good resume, wrote my share of application letters, and in all contacted twelve churches inquiring after their jobs.  (It seemed like a good number.)  At the time I had preached somewhere around sixty Sunday-morning sermons (more than a graduating Bible college senior likely has preached), I had some proficiency in Greek and Hebrew, and I had credentials from two very respected Stone-Campbell schools (Milligan College and Emmanuel School of Religion) leading off my resume.  I also had two and a half years’ teaching experience in college classrooms, a strength that I highlighted for congregations looking for a preacher who could also educate adults in classroom settings.  In the months that followed my sending out the applications, precisely one of the twelve churches ever even contacted me, and that was a two-line email to inform me that I wasn’t what they were looking for.  In the meantime I applied for and gained admission into the University of Georgia’s Ph.D in English program.  I’d like to think that such a move turned out well.

The bottom line is that, from what I’ve heard and from what I’ve seen, the narrative that this article presents, one in which opportunities for those trained only as traditional paid clergy are expanding more quickly than are the numbers of people qualified to be paid clergy, does not seem to be adequate to the realities inside of which actual churches do what they do.

I want to make two things perfectly clear.  For one, I do believe in and honor divine vocation: those whom God calls to preach must preach.  I also must be clear on a second point, namely that that the paid pastor of the local independent congregation is a new arrival on the historical scene, not something that has always been with the Church and not something without which Christ’s Church will perish. Even a cursory survey of church history will turn up Paul, who worked as a tent-maker; friars, who begged from town to town as they preached; celibate secular clergy in the middle ages, whose expenses were kept low by keeping them from (legitimately) supporting children; and the modern movement of bi-vocational ministry among evangelical Protestants.

What the old-time preachers neglect (and remember, I love me some old-time preachers) is that economic realities change over the course of the Church’s history.  The pensioned parish parson is a figure that makes perfect sense in the Church of England when and where said Church is in a place of cultural prominence, and the paid pastor still has some currency in congregations large enough to support that pastor on roughly two percent of the congregation’s income.  (And yes, I know preachers want ten percent.  I also know that the reality is closer to two percent.)  But to tell this generation of young and pious youth group kids that the only faithful course in the world is to specialize in a profession that’s becoming narrower by the year is something akin to encouraging scads of people to do grad school in the humanities.  (And I say this as someone who’s sitting in an English professor’s office and who looks at an English professor in the mirror in the mornings.)  The number of churches that can support a preacher, much less a staff of ordained clergy, is shrinking, and if people really want to reach out to human beings anywhere but in the wealthy suburbs, bivocational preachers or some kind of new-monastic life of simplicity seems to be the way to go.

I realize that the purists among the old-time preachers will likely consider me a sell-out of sorts for writing this, but I do think that Bible colleges, if they want to be responsible as they train the next generation of gospel-proclaimers, should do so by combining a rigorous education in Biblical languages, Biblical interpretation, Church history, and other practices of the theological intellect with training as English teachers, accountants, auto mechanics, and other skilled professions.  (Not all of them need start with vowels.)  And to be perfectly honest, I don’t think that one person has enough hours in a week faithfully do both and raise a family.  For that reason (and because I think it’s a good idea on other theological grounds), I do think that the future of the church will not be with one person in a suit (or a robe, if your tradition is into that) in a pulpit every Sunday morning but with a plurality of teaching elders, sharing the responsibilities of teaching as congregations shoulder the burdens as their lives allow to care for the sick, visit the lonely, and do other things that really ought to be duties distributed among the congregation rather than heroically shouldered by the dude with the Clergy pass at the hospital.

This will require a new array of strategies for training, placing, and otherwise moving future preachers along to where gathered Christians need them, I realize, and off the top of my head, I don’t have any ideas that I’m comfortable writing yet.  But having spent time in the poorer parts of a medium-sized city with a bivocational preacher whom I still hold up as my own model for Church ministry, and having spent some time in poorer parts of non-urban America, where job listings for preachers simply do not yield many good applications, and having spent some time in congregations that struggle to make ends meet, I do happen to think that imagining such strategies should be the business of those people who research, theorize, and write books about living as the church.  And while I’m not out to get any old-time preachers fired, I do wonder just how many traditionally trained old-time preachers would go to waste twenty years from now when a new generation of truck-mechanic-preachers, store-manager-preachers, and computer-programmer-preachers could be reaching rural America, the poor sections of the small cities, and all of those other population groups that can’t really support a Saddleback or a Southeast Christian.  I’m not by any means anti-preacher; I just wonder how much better our preachers could be going forth when the demographics aren’t confining them to the suburbs.

As usual, I do welcome our readers’ feedback, both those from the Stone-Campbell movement and from elsewhere, about whether I’m missing some important reality or if my suggestion makes some sense.  What do you see as the future of Bible-college, Christian-college, and seminary education?

The Christian Humanist Podcast, Episode #30: REVENGE!

19 October 2010

Our theme music this week is Ted Leo’s “The Sons of Cain,” from 2007’s Living with the Living. Does it remind anyone else of Hey Dude for some reason?

General Introduction
- A month of Christian
Humanists
- What’s on the blog?
- Nathan axe crazy
- Like us on Facebook!

Cain, the Sons of Cain, and the Lex Talionis
- Cain takes his revenge
- Cain fears his revenge
- The Mark of Cain
- The mercy of the Law
- The days of Lamech
- Orestes and the Furies
- The city of refuge

Achilles’ Revenge
- Revenge within revenge
- Humiliation atop revenge
- Plato’s Christian Bookstore
- Euripides and Seneca get ugly

Jesus Throws It All Off Balance
- But first, Paul quotes Leviticus
- Purification ritual or apocalyptic cruelty?
- Interpreting Matthew 5
- Pacifism? Law? Ignoring insults?
- What do the Anabaptists say?

Christians Breaking the Rules
- Grendel stands with the sons of Cain
- Mrs. Grendel takes revenge
- Beowulf as divine avenger and magistrate
- Stiletto heels for a proper vendetta
- Seeking revenge with Arthur’s knights
- Good revenge and bad revenge
- Explaining Monty Python

The English Renaissance
- The Seneca revival
- Shakespeare’s balancing act
- Why your high-school English teacher was wrong
- Claudius’s bedroom prayer
- F.O.B.

A New Kind of Revenge Tale
- Spoiler alert
- How Dimmesdale ruins Chillingworth’s revenge
- Who’s the protagonist?
- Updike’s twisting of the already twisted
- Captain Ahab’s quixotic revenge quest

Pop Cultural Manifestations
- Why do Christians get more uneasy about revenge in some genres?
- Dream time
- Justice vs. Achillean rage
- The racial component
- How explicit is it?
- The Biz Never Sleeps
- Where’s the critique?
- A tale of two Eastwoods


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aeschylus. The Oresteia: Agamemnon; The Libation Bearers; The Euminides. Ed. W.B. Stanford. Trans. Robert Fagles. New York: Penguin, 1984.

Aristotle. Poetics. Trans. Malcolm Heath. New York: Penguin, 1997.

Beowulf: A New Verse Translation. Trans. Seamus Heaney. New York: Norton, 2001.

Euripides. Heracles and Other Plays. Trans. John Davie. New York: Penguin, 2002.

Hawthorne, Nathaniel. The Scarlet Letter. Seattle: CreateSpace, 2010.

Homer. The Iliad. Trans. E.V. Rieu. New York: Penguin, 2003.

Kyd, Thomas. The Spanish Tragedy. New York: Book Jungle, 2007.

Malory, Sir Thomas. Le Morte d’Arthur. New York: Norton, 2003.

Melville, Herman. Moby-Dick. New York: Norton, 2001.

Plato. The Republic. Trans. Desmond Lee. New York: Penguin, 2007.

Seneca. Six Tragedies. Trans. Emily Wilson. New York: Oxford UP, 2010.

Shakespeare, William. Hamlet. London: Arden, 2006.

Updike, John. A Month of Sundays. New York: Ballantine, 1996.

—. Roger’s Version. New York: Ballantine, 1996.

—. S. New York: Knopf, 1988.

Synonyms to Ponder: A Reflection on the Lectionary Readings for 24 October 2010

18 October 2010

Revised Common Lectionary Page for 24 October 2010 (22nd Sunday after Pentecost, Year C)

Joel 2:23-32 and Psalm 65Sirach 35:12-17 or Jeremiah 14:7-10, 19-22 and Psalm 84:1-72 Timothy 4:6-8, 16-18Luke 18:9-14

This week’s brief gospel reading, because isolated from the parables around it, made me ponder a verbal connection that I’d not paid much attention to.  For whatever reason, when in the past I’ve thought about the parable of the tax collector and the Pharisee, I’d always thought either of the “sinner’s prayer” that the tax collector is known for (I realize that many traditions call it the “Lord have mercy” or “kyrie eleison” prayer) or the contrast between the two men, but this time I noticed the ending of the parable, the punchline that accompanies some but not all of Jesus’ parables.

“I tell you that this man went down to his home justified rather than the Pharisee. For everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, but he who humbles himself will be exalted.” (18:14, NET)

When pressed to explain the concept of justification, I normally would stick within judicial categories, noting the judge’s-decision character of the category and noting as well its resonance with classical ethical texts.  But in this text, Jesus pairs it not with a statement about right standing with God or with a declaration of good moral character but with statement involving location.  One who exalts himself, who performs the reflexive action of lifting one’s self up, is the one who will be humbled, while the one already humble will be exalted.  In characteristic Lukan fashion, this brief saying blurs conventional lines between the “spiritual” and the “political” so that both the Pharisee’s social capital and his stiff neck could be at stake, just as the tax collector’s status as target of Zealotry and his private contrition are likely on the table.  But at any rate, the idea that justice is itself a sort of elevation reveals nicely that the “justice” that the prophets and that Jesus (himself the greatest of prophets) speak and write of is not the iron-clad enforcement of contracts, the sort of thing that Anselmian pictures of atonement focus so strongly upon and that Charles Dickens so often found monstrous, but a sort of dikaiosyne that, because of an abounding and abundant grace, can in fact elevate “whosoever believeth” without necessarily throwing others down.

I realize as I write this that I’m flying in the faces both of those concerned with social justice and those who have a strong sense of double-predestination.  And although one objection has more to do with the earth that breathing people inhabit and the other with the world that folks inhabit after they’ve stopped breathing, I think both objections at least need to exist in tension with big claims like this one in Luke.  Certainly the New Testament is no stranger either to the idea that those who proudly assert themselves as lords of the earth will face their day of judgment (cf. the Magnificat) or to the idea that there will be spiritual powers resisting Christ until they are thrown down (cf. the closing chapters of Revelation).  But I’m inclined, against both objections to extrapolate from those realities some sort of prior mathematical quota that will not be satisfied save with the completion of a certain degree of mortals’ suffering.  I’m aware both of the Marxists’ arguments (and remember that the Marxists are some of the sharpest theorists about Capitalism) about the finitude of the world and the infinity of the desires of the warring classes; and I’m aware of the trilemma that predestination treatises lay forward about saving none, saving some, and saving all.  But once again, as the disciple of Walter Brueggemann that I’ve become, I tend to read such statements as this one, that seem to extend offers of divine grace as far as those being saved will take them, as serious statements rather than hyperbole or wishful thinking or anthropomorphism or whatever the “don’t believe what the text seems to be saying” device of the season happens to be.

That digression out of the way, this text stands as a reminder for the Church as we approach the season of Advent that humility, properly conceived of as knowing one’s place in the schemata of creation and redemption, is a central virtue for the Christian witness not because God wants us to feel like crap about ourselves but precisely because our mission, to tell truthfully the gospel of Christ and thus to make disciples of the King, is entirely too important to lose a grasp on the truth, namely that those preaching salvation are also those being saved.  May our eyes remain open, looking now in the mirror at our sinfulness, then on the world languishing and waiting for the truth, then perhaps once more, lest we confuse ourselves with the King whom we proclaim.

A Link or Eight for to Ponder and Meditate

15 October 2010

Long on Diagnosis, Short on Viable Responses: A Review of Generation iY

13 October 2010


Generation iY: Our Last Chance to Save Their Future
by Tim Elmore
228 pp.  Poet Gardner Publishing.  $16.99

Tim Elmore came to Emmanuel College in early August as our guest speaker for faculty workshop week, and every faculty member present got a free copy of this book.  His workshop presentation derived more or less point-for-point from the book, and I could tell that he imagined the speaking tour and the book as two parts of one whole.  (For what he’s doing, that’s not a bad thing.)  I’ll admit that I’m more impressed by the book than I was by his talk–for whatever reason, his talk spent much more time on the “side charts” that aren’t part of the book’s central argument, and I fear that he missed an opportunity to advance what in the book stands as a fairly clear-minded analysis of things.

Elmore’s diagnosis of Generation iY (those born between 1990 and 2001) is somewhat bleak, reminiscent of Mark Bauerlein’s in The Dumbest Generation. (Not coincidentally, Bauerlein and Elmore are friends.)  Their attention spans are shorter than those of earlier student cohorts, their sense of morality will condemn a litterbug but shrug at someone who falsifies information on a resume, and their sense of entitlement makes them nightmares to have in a classroom or to hire as an entry-level employee.  (It’s gratifying to read that folks in the corporate world, who hold a paycheck over their heads, also can’t get anywhere with them.)  Elmore, an evangelical Christian and longtime friend of Emmanuel College, points to certain tendencies among these kids’ Generation X and Baby Boomer parents as the root causes: the parents of affluent teenagers and twenty-somethings (I’ll get to my critique of his apparent sample later) have tended to be parents who refuse to let their kids taste even a small bit of failure; who overschedule their kids’ lives so that they never have to decide what to do with an afternoon; who run damage control so that there are never any consequences for unwise decisions; who inflate their kids’ egos and expectations of the world in an overreaction to (what I see as) the Social Darwinism within which they grew up; and who put attention-sucking electronic devices in kids’ hands and then fawn over how “tech-savvy” they are (any college teacher who’s ever assigned even a rudimentary web project knows how funny this claim is).  He’s not all gloom and doom, of course.  (If he were, he’s just be plagiarizing Bauerlein.)  He thinks that this group of students adapts just as well to adult responsibility and perhaps has an even more developed sense of morality than us jaded Gen-Xers; their main problem is that adults, and especially parents, have kept them from developing such capacities.

One of the striking images he provides for this (not that his stories are uniformly helpful) has to do with a butterfly emerging from a cocoon: As a child, as Elmore tells it, he discovered a cocoon on a branch just as the organism inside started to make its way out into the world.  Being the helpful soul he was, he used his fingernails to help the little booger force the cocoon open a bit wider.  When the butterfly still did not emerge, he forced the opening a bit wider, and when that still did not yield a butterfly, he broke the cocoon entirely open.  What emerged, in the story, was a deformed animal, nothing like a butterfly but without the promise of a true caterpillar.  It died shortly thereafter.

The point of the allegory is clear enough: he was acting as so many parents have, and the overgrown children that have resulted are not ready to fly.  Elmore diagnoses nicely a generation of American youth that’s at once overscheduled but without much of an aim in life; convinced that they can do anything they set their minds to but without the discipline to set their butts down and study (I’ll save the joke about whether they have minds); and ruthlessly amoral one minute but moralistically self-righteous the next.  His solutions for parents, unfortunately, seem to hinge upon the assumption that every middle-class parent has access to the social connections to which he, as a corporate trainer, has access.  He tells stories about how he introduced his daughter to Congresswomen and surgeons to act as short-term mentors but has few suggestions for folks (like me) who don’t have personal connections with Congresswomen.  When he gets to his son the boasting gets even more grand: he had Tony Dungy talk to his son and some of the neighborhood kids; had USMC colonels visit with them; and received personal letters for each of the neighborhood’s teenage boys from the President of the United States.  (He doesn’t specify which one, but that’s not material to my point.)  I can imagine rough analogies to these experiences that a small-time English professor might bring to bear, but if I were to go strictly from the text itself, I’d assume that Elmore knows that there’s going to be an aristocracy, based on the ability to expose one’s children to the powerful,  that rises out of this moment, and that he’s the proud papa of two of those aristocrats.

But not all is that far over the top.  For college teachers (and I are one), these changing realities within the students we teach (and I’ve been at this long enough to teach the last Gen-Xers at the outset of my teaching career and observe the early Gen-Y shade over into the text-message-addicted iY) mean that students are going to complain more, do less of the traditional work assigned, and otherwise buck against the ways of teaching that have certainly changed with the advent of mass-printed textbooks but nonetheless have remained basically static for a couple hundred years.  His pedagogical solutions actually strike me as more helpful than his parenting tips: he calls for teachers to adapt as the students will have to, not trading content for toys but imagining how differently to frame and deliver the content (as in the fifth canon of rhetoric, not as in UPS).  It’s a philosophy of education I was on-board with even back in 2000, when I constructed rudimentary html pages for my composition courses, and although I’m less optimistic about Len Sweet’s EPIC model of communication than Elmore is, I do agree that education, because a historically contingent practice, gains and loses horizons as history happens, and clinging to horizons no longer available is not properly conservative but antiquarian.  And although I love me an obscure old text as much as the next guy, I know full well that such things are the province of the specialist researcher, not the dedicated educator.

Although the book’s diagnosis of the glut of electronic distractions, and especially his solutions to the problems, tend to center almost exclusively on affluent suburban American (and to some extent western European) families, he does note well that, due to rising birth rates and sharply dropping infant mortality rates in the last twenty or so years, this global age-cohort has actually eclipsed the vaunted Baby Boom of the early automobile age.  And as geographic mobility became easy and accessible (so that young men could easily enough leave town when girls got pregnant) and social mobility declined (so that fewer and fewer could support a family financially), giant swaths of this enormous global younger generation have known nothing of life with a present father.  (If any feminists are still reading at this point, I’d love to read your take on the complexities of this reality.)  In America, where that global swell of mobile-but-desperate human beings has meant that the wealthy and powerful can find abundant desperation to exploit (they call the phenomenon “cheap labor” and attribute it to “global economic forces,” but I for one prefer to call it what it is), this has translated into a job market for the children of affluence which rewards the intelligent and tenacious but which cannot seem to find any tenacity.  And in the two-thirds world, this has meant a deterioration of the wisdom of the elders and a ready supply of young, bored men for warlords, terrorists, and other postmodern criminals to exploit. And they have.  The book does not say nearly as much about women of this generation, and for that reason, again, I welcome feminist reactions to the book and to this review.

Overall, although the book tends towards alarmism at points and towards boasting rather than solutions at others, the diagnosis end of things is worthwhile–Elmore recognizes that whatever moral and professional shortcomings “kids these days” exhibit are best studied with an eye on the complex interactions of global economic/political trends, changes in the mindsets of parents, and an array of other variables.  For college teachers and youth ministers and other such folks, this easy-reading book is not a bad place to continue our thinking on such things.

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