Monthly Archives: April 2010

An Academic Interlude

30 April 2010

Yeah, what Nate said.

Which Sport Has the Most Home Runs?

30 April 2010

“Separate Truths” by Stephen Prothero

Relationships between traditions are my intellectual bread and butter. When I started studying the various influences of Anglican sacramental life, Presbyterian church polity, Scottish Enlightenment philosophy, frontier revivalism, and other ingredients that make up my own non-denomination’s background, I was hooked, and to this day I welcome opportunities to read studies on my own background.  My dissertation (which is going to get some much-needed attention this summer) is about the influences of Calvin, Erasmus, and the ancients on the ways that English poets and playwrights write about royal and other succession moments.  I positively geek out on Lost and all of the intellectual traditions that run up against each other on that wonderful island.  When genuinely different traditions interact with one another, really good philosophical questions come to articulation, but the other side of that coin is that folks who rush to reduce difference to ornament or other adiaphora tend to take the joy out of those moments of encounter.

So when I read this article, I rejoiced more than a little bit that Prothero, a professor of religion, holds that the strong differences between “the world’s religions” (his phrase) are precisely what makes them worth believing and that folks who claim that all religions are the same speak either nonsense or the fruit of ignorance.  (Before anyone asks, nonsense by definition might or might not be the fruit of ignorance, but if it’s truly nonsense, there’s no way of telling.)  He rightly criticizes those who would never say that capitalism and socialism are the same or that democracy and totalitarianism are two paths to the same destination but say equally stupid things about Islam and Judaism or Christianity and Buddhism.

The article speaks for itself, so I’ll resist an urge to summarize, but probably my favorite bit of criticism Prothero offers is the view, spoken often but perhaps most famously by Huston Smith, that all religions offer humanity salvation.  Prothero makes the perfectly sensible analogy between this statement and a hypothetical claim that football players hit just as many home runs as do baseball players.  To say that football players (while they’re playing football and thus while being football players in a rigorous sense) do not hit any home runs at all is not to pronounce football inherently inferior to baseball, much less to say that baseball players have any moral right to inflict violence on football players for their inability to hit home runs or so that they’ll be convinced to get into a tradition that hits home runs.  But it is to say that the concept of a home run only has intelligibility in a constellation of traditions surrounding softball and baseball and kickball, and salvation is not something that Buddhists shoot for and miss but something that they don’t even shoot for.

Taking Prothero seriously does not preclude evangelism, of course; just the opposite, his analysis points towards a relationship between Christians and Hindus in which the central questions themselves are at stake, and there’s no bad-faith assumption on either side that their goals are anything already settled.  A look at recent Christian apologetics writers from van Til to Milbank will reveal a similar focus on ontological and axiomatic roots, and certainly nobody who’s read Augustine can argue that one of his central points is that the desires themselves become disordered in a state of sin.

If you notice that my posts and David Grubbs’s have been shorter than usual in the last couple weeks, click your way to a few colleges’ academic calendars, see where we are, and pray for our souls.  We’ll be back in force when the spirits that govern the semester cycle have done with us.

The Christian Humanist Podcast, Episode #21: Literary Criticism

28 April 2010

That’s the end of Season 2, folks. We’ve had a great time doing the show, and we’re glad you listen. We explain our summer plans in the show itself. Keep listening, and keep reading!

General Introduction
- So long, Season 2
- Listener feedback
- What’s on the blog?
- Our summer plans and our love for decimal places

Beginning Apophatically
- Literary criticism vs. critical theory
- The Academy and the newspaper
- The professor and the amateur
- The unconscious and the conscious
- Literary criticism vs. book reviews
- Why age is more than a number
- The bleeding edge of criticism

Auden Makes the Rules
- Historical context
- Overcome evil with good
- Subjectivity
- How to tell if a critic is any good
- Development of taste
- The pleasures of the text

Old Stuff
- The extreme POETIX! of  Chuck “Ham-Bone” Aristotle
- Dorothy Sayers’s internalization of Aristotle
- The gaping hole of the Anglo-Saxon period
- Boethius and his epic, tragic harlots
- Philip Sidney to the rescue!
- Milton’s dismissal of fiction
- The Calvinist aesthetic defense of Scripture

The Aesthetes and Decadents
- The critic as artist and the artist as critic
- Creation vs. criticism
- Rules for independent critics
- Why Wilde would like Lester Bangs
- Complicating, not explaining
- What does “art for art’s sake” actually mean?

A New Kind of Criticism
- Connection to the Southern Agrarians
- Reaction to the Old Historicism
- Text as self-contained and unified
- Why the New Critics overreacted
- New Criticism as all-consuming blob

Mythological Criticism
- Deeper into Tolkien
- The Mythography Project
- Finding patterns in mythology
- Frye’s embrace of archetype
- The Gospel’s role in myth criticism

Heroic Criticism and American Studies
- The Heroic Critic as true believer
- Defining the newly emergent America
- Lionel Trilling’s The Liberal Imagination
- The difference in seriousness
- Intellectual decline
- [] you, you bourgeoisie pig!
- Defining Americanism(s)

Jiving Criticism and Art
- Why poets can’t write well about poetry
- Historical moments
- The need for critical distance
- A fist-fight breaks out!!
- Artists who do great criticism
- Is this a difference in eras?
- The problem with self-accounts
- Michial prepares for hate mail from creative-writing students
- Does scholarship create better writing?

Getting Personal
- To what extent is our academic output literary criticism?
- Auden makes David self-aware
- Nathan’s Hegelian synthesis
- Michial tries to complicate, not simplify

Post-Theory Criticism
- The Emmanuel Laboratory
- Nathan as the singular Voice of Criticism
- David fights to stay in the middle
- The non-academic return to Auden’s world

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aristotle. Poetics. Trans. Malcolm Heath. New York: Penguin, 1997.

Auden, W.H. The Dyer’s Hand and Other Essays. New York: Vintage, 1990.

Bangs, Lester. Psychotic Reactions and Carburetor Dung. Ed. Greil Marcus. New York: Vintage, 1988.

Barthes, Roland. The Pleasure of the Text. Trans. Richard Miller. San Francisco: Hill and Wang, 1975.

Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. Trans. Victor Watts. New York: Penguin, 1999.

Brooks, Cleanth. The Well-Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry. New York: Mariner, 1956.

Calvin, John. The Institutes of the Christian Religion. Trans. Ford Lewis Battles. Ed. John T. McNeill. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960. Two volumes.

Campbell, Joseph. The Hero with a Thousand Faces. San Francisco: New World Library, 2008.

Chesterton, G.K. Charles Dickens: A Critical Study. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2009.

Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. Biographia Literaria. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985.

Eliot, T.S. “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism. London: Methuen, 1976. 47-59.

Fiedler, Leslie. Love and Death in the American Novel. New York: Anchor, 1992.

Frazier, James. The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion. New York: Oxford UP, 2009.

Frye, Northrop. Biblical and Classical Myths: The Mythological Framework of Western Culture. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 2004.

Jung, Carl. Jung on Mythology. Ed. Robert A. Segal. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998.

Marx, Leo. The Machine in the Garden. New York: Oxford UP, 2000.

Mather, Cotton. Magnalia Christi Americana. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2006. Two volumes.

Milton, John. Paradise Regained. The Major Works. Ed. Stephen Orgel and Jonathan Goldberg. New York: Oxford UP, 2003. 619-669.

Parrington, Vernon Louis. Main Currents in American Thought. Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1987. Three volumes.

Patterson, Lee. Negotiating the Past: The Historical Understanding of Medieval Literature. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1987.

Ransom, John Crowe. The New Criticism. New York: Greenwood, 1979.

Sayers, Dorothy L. The Mind of the Maker. New York: Continuum, 2004.

Sidney, Sir Philip. “The Defence of Poesy.” The Major Works. Ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones. New York: Oxford UP, 2009. 212-251.

Smith, Henry Nash. Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2007.

Tolkien, J.R.R. “Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics.” The Monsters and the Critics and Other Essays. Ed. Christopher Tolkien. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. 5-48.

Trilling, Lionel. The Liberal Imagination. New York: New York Review of Books, 2008.

Updike, John. Hugging the Shore: Essays and Criticism. New York: Vintage, 1984.

Weston, Jessie. From Ritual to Romance. New York: Waking Lion, 2008.

Wilde, Oscar. “The Critic as Artist.” The Major Works. Ed. Isobel Murray. New York: Oxford UP, 2000. 241-297.

Wordsworth, William. The Prelude. New York: Penguin, 1996.

Whose Apostolic Succession?

27 April 2010

When I was (briefly) a catechumen in the Orthodox Church, one of the big sticking points for me was the concept of apostolic succession. When an Orthodox Christian, reciting the Nicene Creed, says that he or she believes “In one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church,” it’s an assertion that really means something—from my understanding, any given Orthodox priest can trace himself back via laying-on of hands to the earliest figures in Christianity. Catholic priests can do the same.

We Protestants don’t have this advantage, something the Reformers were obviously aware of—and yet the confessions that subscribe to the Nicene Creed (including own denomination, the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America) haven’t excised the “apostolic” any more than they’ve excised the “Catholic”—though they’ve made the capital C lowercase. So what gives?

We get the answer, as we get the answer to so many questions about Protestant practice, from Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion. He rails against the Catholic Church’s claims of succession, as he rails against many other things that the Catholic Church does, and then he drives the knife in: “the pretence of succession is vain, if posterity does not retain the truth of Christ, which was handed down to them by their fathers, safe and uncorrupted, and continue in it” (IV.ii.2).

The apostolic succession to which Calvin clings, then, is a sort of spiritual succession—hands have not been laid on priests from generation to generation, but it doesn’t matter. Protestants can, by this line of thinking, claim apostolic authority because we believe what the apostles believed. It is for this reason that Calvin (and nearly every conservative Protestant after him) denies the use of what we might call “creative theology”:

[T]he Spirit, promised to us, has not the task of inventing new and unheard revelations, or of forgiving a new kind of doctrine, to lead us away from the received doctrine of the gospel, but of sealing our minds with that very doctrine which is commended by the gospel. (I.ix.1)

Elsewhere, he tells us that “daily oracles are not sent from heaven, for it pleased the Lord to hallow his truth to everlasting remembrance in the Scriptures alone” (I.vii.1). Thus the need for sola scriptura—if we are to be apostolic in the sense that Calvin claims apostolic succession, we can’t have our authority be anything that comes after the Apostles.

Cotton Mather agrees. In his Magnalia Christi Americana, he tells us that while he does not “say, that the Churches of New-England are the most regular that can be; yet I do say, and am sure, that they are very like unto those that were in the first ages of Christianity.” Perfection is not necessary for apostolic succession and authority; one’s doctrine must, however, be as close to that of the Apostles as possible.

Note, though, that this vision of apostolic succession is inherently conservative, inherently against progressivism in theology; Mather says outright that “the first Age was the golden Age; to return unto that, will make a man a Protestant, and, I may add, a Puritan.” I do not believe this is a quirk in Mather’s theology; I think this sort of conservatism is implied in Calvin himself.

It reminds me of a story I heard about Billy Graham, years ago. He was visiting the Soviet Union, I believe, and talking to a liberal Russian priest. The priest didn’t much care for him and accused him of setting Christianity back fifty years. “That’s too bad,” said Graham, “because I wanted to set it back two thousand years.” This is the Protestant attitude toward apostolic authority—we must not move forward from the doctrine of the Apostles.

We can argue a few points here: Number one, the Nicene creed comes along centuries after the Apostles themselves, so the degree to which it adequately represents their viewpoints is debatable. (I’m of the opinion that it sticks very closely to the theology of the New Testament; many of our readers may disagree.) Number two, many generally Protestant and specifically Calvinist doctrines—sola scriptura, double predestination, etc.—are at least arguably sixteenth-century inventions. (I don’t think they are, in the sense that I think they flow naturally from the text of the New Testament, but I also recognize that they are formulated most clearly many centuries after the deaths of the Apostles.)

But let’s leave that sticky debate alone for now and assume, with most of the early figures of Protestantism, that the basics of the Reformed Church (I use the term in its widest possible sense, to cover all the figures of the Reformation and the Anabaptists, too) are more in line with the early Church than the doctrine and practice of the Catholic Church of the era were. What does apostolic succession mean in this context?

When Catholics and Orthodox claim apostolic authority, it is a loose thing—Peter approved of his successor, and so on and so forth, so there’s no demand that the current generation look exactly like the first. Protestant claims at apostolic authority are the exact opposite: We have it because our theology if not our praxis looks just like Peter’s. This is much more constricting and requires a canonization not only of the Bible but of the ecclesiastical practices of the early Church. (My Orthodox friends must be falling out of their chairs laughing, since they too claim to look more or less like the early Church.)

What this means is that liberal Protestantism in almost all its forms—let’s say the major figures are Hegel, Schleiermacher, von Harnock, Ritschl, Bultmann, Tillich, and at least some members of the contemporary Emergent Church—is not Protestant because it jettisons the very basis of Protestant doctrine, this “spiritual” concept of apostolic succession. Creative or progressive theologians typically believe that we should move past not only the Apostles but also Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and yes, Hegel and the rest. It’s not quite right to call them Protestant then, and in fact, this is probably a term that has outlived its usefulness.

To their credit, the Emergent theologians seem largely aware of this problem, which is why most of them have jettisoned the use of the term Protestant in favor of that complicated Emerging/Emergent/Emerged system that I don’t even come close to understanding. Likewise, Brian McLaren’s “new kind of Christianity”—while I don’t believe it is in any sense new—suggests a certain post-Protestant aesthetic.

My question, then, is what progressive theologians (in the nineteenth, twentieth, or 21st centuries) do about that pesky word apostolic in the Nicene Creed. I know that many liberal Christians are not all that interested in creeds, so chucking the whole thing is certainly one option, albeit one that horrifies me. The more cogent option is to perform a Calvin-esque redefinition of apostolic—so what does that look like in a progressive context?

An Excuse for a Missing Lectionary Post

26 April 2010

Revised Common Lectionary Readings for 1 May 2010 (Fifth Sunday of Easter, Year C)

Acts 11:1-18Psalm 148Revelation 21:1-6John 13:31-35

A thousand apologies to our Christian Humanist readers for my lack of a lectionary post for this week.  With the end of the semester closing fast, I simply do not have even the small spare time that this post requires of me every week.  Look for this series to start back up Monday, and forgive an overwhelmed and underproductive sinner.

Attack of the Pathetic Fallacy

23 April 2010

I do not recall when I first encountered the notion of a pathetic fallacy: a literature course, doubtless, but I’ve had many of those. I was almost certainly an undergraduate, because the pathetic fallacy was introduced simply as a term, with a plain, dry definition; I was told nothing of its connotative implications, and we certainly didn’t read John Ruskin’s essay, “Of the Pathetic Fallacy.” The definition I was given was very like the one provided by Wiktionary at the link above: “[T]reating inanimate objects or concepts as if they were human beings, for instance having thoughts or feelings.” It was, I was taught, synonymous with such terms as anthropomorphism and personification. What I was not told was the attitude implicit in the term, expressed in the bit I omitted from the definition above: the pathetic fallacy is “an error in logical argumentation.” Thus does the Victorian Ruskin employ the word “fallacy,” because, for him, art’s paramount concern is to be true, to see the world as it is, so that personification is a frivolous fiction or a lapse of sanity:

[i]t is the fallacy of wilful fancy, which involves no real expectation that it will be believed; or else it is a fallacy caused by an excited state of the feelings, making us, for the time, more or less irrational. (5)

Not that the pathetic fallacy is not pleasing, but “it is only the second order of poets who much delight in it,” while “the greatest poets do not often admit this kind of falseness” (6). Such poets rise above the mind-bending caprice of emotion:

[T]he intellect also rises, till it is strong enough to assert its rule against, or together with, the utmost efforts of the passions; and the whole man stands in an iron glow, white hot, perhaps, but still strong, and in no wise evaporating ; even if he melts, losing none of his weight. (8)

The rational, unpoetical man sees autumn leaves moved about by the wind; the irrational, poetical man sees dancing autumn leaves; but the rational, poetical man sees autumn leaves move as if dancing, his logical mind careful to preserve the self-awareness of simile.

But all of this Ruskinage is preamble! Let’s move on to Tolkien, shall we?

Awakening Metaphor and the Song of Willows

The moment to which I wish to draw your attention, dear reader, occurs about halfway through Book 1 of The Lord of the Ring, as Frodo and company begin their furtive journey to Rivendell by way of the perilous Old Forest. The Old Forest, says Merry Brandybuck, is “very much more alive” than the tame woods of the Shire (121). This “aliveness” is referenced many times as they ride fearfully through the forest, yet Tolkien carefully hedges the hobbits’ perceptions with the language of subjectivity: they “got an uncomfortable feeling” that the tree were watching them, “the trees seemed constantly to bar their way,” “it seemed to them that the Forest relented,” etc. (122, 123).

Having been prepped throughout childhood with spook tales of the Old Forest, the hobbits are emotionally overwrought, alternately panicked and despondent as they get more and more lost. They are, according to Ruskin, in a state particularly susceptible to the pathetic fallacy: “[T]hat of a mind and body in some sort too weak to deal fully with what is before them or upon them; borne away, or over-clouded, or over-dazzled by emotion” (8). Tolkien’s emphasis on feelings and “seeming,” accompanied by the hobbits’ mounting anxiety, encourages readers to be skeptical of these perceptions of “aliveness”–we sympathize with the poor little guys, but they seem only to be lost hikers freaking themselves out.

When, in the end, they leave the deep woods and find themselves in the Withywindle Valley–not the place they’d meant to go–the hobbits’ paranoia about the Old Forest has peeked: they are convinced that the trees have driven them to the Withywindle River for some sinister purpose. However, Frodo and company are also exhausted. After emerging from the stuffy woods, they walk for a time in the cool shade of the willows, then all begin to feel drowsy. This seems natural enough: it’s been a hard journey, and the combination of shade, a cool breeze, and the lulling rustle of willow leaves make for an ideal outdoor nap. The hobbits process these conditions as they have all phenomena in the Old Forest: they personify them.

There now seemed hardly a sound in the air. The flies had stopped buzzing. Only a gentle noise on the edge of hearing, a soft fluttering as of a song half whispered, seemed to stir in the boughs above. [Frodo] lifted his heavy eyes and saw leaning over him a huge willow-tree, old and hoary. Enormous it looked, its sprawling branches going up like reaching arms with many long-fingered hands, its knotted and twisted trunk gaping in wide fissure that creaked faintly as the boughs moved. [...]

[...] [Merry and Pippin] looked up at the grey and yellow leaves, moving softly against the light, and singing. They shut their eyes, and then it seemed that they could almost hear words, cool words, saying something about water and sleep. They gave themselves up to the spell and fell fast asleep at the foot of the great grey willow. (127-8)

If one is unaware of what happens next, this is actually a pleasant scene, and also a poetically apt description of napping under a willow tree, which I’ve done and can recommend.

Unfortunately for Frodo and company, the scene continues: the willow flings Frodo into the river, then seals up Merry and Pippin within the fissures of its massive trunk. The old willow is alive. The hobbits’ pathetic fallacy is not fallacious, but precisely descriptive. Their fears are not irrational projections on inanimate nature, but completely justified. The rustling leaves were not like a voice: they were a voice that “rustled and whispered, but with a sound now of faint and far-off laughter” (129). The willow is alive, aware, and active; Tolkien’s emphasis on feeling and “seeming” is a trick, lulling readers as surely as the leaves lulled the hobbits. He permits us to get comfortable in the familiarity of metaphor–and then he wakes the metaphor up, and we find we were never safe, that we walked in Faërie and knew it not.

Rejoicing or a Passable Simulation Thereof?

I certainly admire this as a literary technique, but it’s also made me think about how I read poetry, especially the poetry of scripture. Consider, for example, the following excerpts from two very similar psalms, Psalm 96 and Psalm 98:

10Say among the heathen that the LORD reigneth: the world also shall be established that it shall not be moved: he shall judge the people righteously.
11Let the heavens rejoice, and let the earth be glad; let the sea roar, and the fulness thereof.
12Let the field be joyful, and all that is therein: then shall all the trees of the wood rejoice
13Before the LORD: for he cometh, for he cometh to judge the earth: he shall judge the world with righteousness, and the people with his truth.

6With trumpets and sound of cornet make a joyful noise before the LORD, the King.
7Let the sea roar, and the fulness thereof; the world, and they that dwell therein.
8Let the floods clap their hands: let the hills be joyful together
9Before the LORD; for he cometh to judge the earth: with righteousness shall he judge the world, and the people with equity.

Seems to be an awful lot of anthropomorphizing going on here: rejoicing heavens, roaring seas, applauding floods. Still, it’s effective: I imagine crashing waves and swaying trees, and feel I know what it is like for nature to “rejoice before the LORD.” But then comes that kill-joy John Ruskin: the crashing waves just sound like applause, which is also suggested by their movement; the grain that bends in the breeze looks like it’s dancing, but it isn’t, and the susurration of stalk on stalk is most certainly not quiet song. It’s just a lot of inanimate stuff, moving randomly because of the wind or gravity or whatever, which are themselves random and animate. So, no actual rejoicing, really: just an impressionable psalmist caught up in the moment, unaware of his silliness.

But if we read these psalms in this way, what is left? If creation is not rejoicing, but instead doing a passable simulation thereof, at least for those susceptible to such crudities–do these verses say anything meaningful at all? No, if this is our hermeneutic, these verses are nothing but artful filler: there seems to be no room in Ruskin’s conception of nature for a rejoicing creation.

Perhaps, then, we ought to try another conception of nature. I’d like to take a stab at that, taking Tolkien and the psalmists as my guide. That will be the project of another day, though; and, like as not, this post will grow into a Gilmourian serial. For now, I am content if I have made our readers look uneasily at willow trees, unsure whether they will attack or rejoice.

Works Cited

Tolkien, J. R. R. The Fellowship of the Ring. London: Houghton Mifflin, 1988.

Media Ecology and the Reformation: Some Brief Thoughts

22 April 2010

The Christian Humanist crew got an email from Ford Seeuws,  listener and friend of Michial Farmer, last week, and the questions were interesting enough that I wanted to deal with them at some length on the blog.  One section of his email read as follows:

A recent tweet sparked my curiosity, and I’d like to hear your thoughts on the questions it raised for me.

A gentleman posted the following: “two great myths: the newspaper model is broken and the Internet is going to save us.”

Reading that made me wonder if there may have been a similar gut reaction to the printing press after it was introduced. What was the prevailing reaction to the printing press? Did people think it was going to go away? Do you think the printing press and the internet are analogous in the scope of their influence?

What do you guys think about the new media? About the influence of the internet and blogs on journalism and the future of news in general?

As far as I can tell historically (and I’ll rely on our readers to correct me if I’m wrong here), there wasn’t a great deal of reflection on technology in its own right in the fifteenth century when Gutenberg and Caxton and company were doing their thing.  In those times people were certainly excited about intellectual changes, but with regards to the tools by which folks delivered those changes to one another, the impression I get from reading around is that people in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, by and large, considered those tools media in a fairly straightforward sense: they were tools by which the content (i.e. the important stuff) got from hither to thither, simply the middle term between the two.

More sophisticated reflections on tools as epistemologically significant seem to start around the career of Francis Bacon, who I think of as one of the first great technological thinkers, and in the ensuing centuries, folks like Giambattista Vico and G.W.F. Hegel follow his lead in Vico’s The New Science and Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics, both of which explore in fairly lengthy passages the strong changes in thinking that come with movable type and inexpensive printing.  Hegel especially advances the idea that each historical epoch derives its particular character not only from the “great men” who drive its major events (though he does write a fair bit about great men) but also from the spiritual and material conditions within which and against which people had options to think.

Both Vico and Hegel are marked by a fairly thoroughgoing progressivism, so while they both acknowledged that history includes bad phenomena as well as good, they tend to think of them as “setbacks” in a story that is in large part heading towards something good, which Hegel famously called universal freedom.  With the coming of Karl Marx, the first shades of suspicion crop up, though his suspicion does not extend to that inarticulable reality that will come after the revolution.  Really Friedrich Nietzsche starts the industry of being skeptical of the progress of ideas.  His writings on Christianity and on liberalism label them as parts of an ongoing degeneration rather than progression, not from lesser freedom to greater but from resentment of greatness to positive restraint of greatness.  As the twentieth century’s intellectual contests took shape, more often than not the descendants of Hegel and Marx, who thought of history as a grand parade headed for good things, clashed with those suspicious of that progressive metanarrative, sometimes Fundamentalist and evangelical Christians (those who had not been appropriated by Capitalist versions of Hegel’s progressivism) and sometimes by Foucaultian and other nihilist skeptics.  Technology becomes something very different depending upon where one sits: for the Marxist, each labor-saving advance means that, if a society can be done with the mental baggage that remains when a new tool comes into being, one can advance another step towards the classless society, one in which the laborer and the owner have negated one another, leaving in their wake at this point along the way the weekend, at that point the forty-hour work week, and so on.  That few Westerners can imagine a week that doesn’t have a weekend testifies to the fact that Marx has, to some extent, won.  On the other hand, for the Foucaultian, the weekend is itself a mechanism of the system’s power, turning what was once festival and recreation into another sort of work, one that doesn’t leave “the office” and “the home” separated but demands that what was once “private” life now be consumed by “public” matters.  (Foucault has a way of inspiring scare-quotes.)

What does this have to do with newspapers, you ask?  My answer is that a newspaper makes most sense not as some sort of brute fact nor primarily as a commodity, whose place in the world is exhausted by buying and selling.  The newspaper, like the printing press before it, inhabits a place in a moral world that, in my own thinking, has priority over the economic.  Whether one imagines newspapers as vehicles by which freedom expands its purview and thus advances history towards its free end or whether one imagines newspapers as just one more technological subtlety in the never-ending recurrence of the system’s exertion of power means everything for how one imagines “the end of the newspaper” or the rise of whatever comes next.

For my money, when I read writings on media ecology (that sub-discipline of philosophy and sociology which examines the ways in which media constitute the world in which we live), I prefer the progressives.  Although I’m skeptical of simplistic narratives of historical inevitability (the sort which I critiqued when I reviewed Brian McLaren’s book), when I do think about such things as newspapers and the Internet, I do tend to agree with folks like David Simon that the dead trees and easily-smeared ink aren’t the real point of the alarm, that something like democracy (which is not the Kingdom of God but does most things better than does hereditary rule) loses its particular character when those who stand to solidify their power and pass it on to hand-picked successors (the nature of hereditary rule does not always involve consanguinity) have the ability to control the information that goes to the people.  Without a robust and funded apparatus of investigation, one which in the modern world requires professionals who do not have another job to perform or children to tend to all day, the politicians have resources to spare that they can and will dedicate to presenting their own “message” to the consumer-public, and as long as people don’t see the rot, they happily ignore the rot and keep buying stuff from the rotten machine.  That’s why folks like David Simon put the decline of newspapers not with the rise of the Internet, much less with Craig’s List, but with the consolidation of newspapers in the late eighties and early nineties, the time when local ownership and control gave way to international media empires and when the moral connection to and duty to be investigators for particular communities gave way to ever-thicker profit margins.  (It’s funny how someone who at first appears, as Simon does, to be a classical Leftist becomes upon inspection a localist and in some ways a conservative.)

Among the other progressive-narrative writers who have written interesting things on media ecology in general and on newspapers and television in particular are my favorite media-ecology odd couple, Al Gore and Neil Postman.  Postman spent much of the late eighties and nineties attacking Al Gore at every turn, not for being a Democrat (Postman didn’t seem much to like Democrats or Republicans, which is part of his appeal for me) but because he was such a vocal cheerleader for the Internet.  As far as Postman was concerned, the Internet was consumerism gone mad, the device that would signal an even more massive setback for enlightenment (and the Enlightenment) than did television.  What makes Al Gore’s book great (and I’m not by any means a cheerleader for Al Gore as a politician) is that he takes as his starting point (citing Postman liberally along the way) that the character of print is to encourage linear argument and to dispel picture-thinking (ideology) in favor of rigorous deliberation, a central assertion in Postman’s own philosophy and one of the things that made him think that the Internet and its biggest cheerleader were bad for progress.  Gore’s brilliant turn is to demonstrate that the Internet, though it has the tendency to maintain and even to extend consumerism, also has the potential to realize with greater power even than dead trees with easily-smeared ink, the vision that Postman had for the newspaper, namely a form of textual discourse with global reach and a cost of entry so low as to be zero in growing parts of the world.

Between those two arguments, the call for linear textual discourse and the vocation of professional investigation and reportage, I think, along with Gore, that the Internet, conceived rightly, can and will become a vehicle for civilization (considered in a moral sense) even as it continues to feed the crass desires of the already-crass.  (Yes, Avenue Q, I acknowledge that the Internet is indeed for porn.)  As Neil Postman taught me years ago, the Internet, like all technologies, involves some sort of Faustian bargain, and whatever it brings, it won’t be a simplistic “progress.”  But to bring forth a bit of Postman that doesn’t get quoted as often, I’d also say that to be “against technology” is somewhat akin to a fish’s being “against water”–one doesn’t really have that choice, and if one opts to go “off the grid,” the preposition in the phrase already concedes that the grid is still defining the situation.  Instead, and here I’m drawing on all of these complex but progressive thinkers, whatever happens next is by definition going to be revolutionary, but the human task after any revolution is not simply to sit about and marvel at the revolution but to keep working at being human in the Brave New World.  I’d contend that part of that good humanity is a translation of the investigator/writer that necessarily changes in translation but nonetheless remains analogously related to the newspaperman of the age of print.

Commercial Break II: Erasmus and Calvin

21 April 2010

For our next pair of mugs, we’ve chosen another pair of familiar faces: Desiderius Erasmus, the CHP poster boy, and John Calvin, the subject of our second podcast. (Seems so long ago now!) Enjoy!

The Christian Humanist Store

The Christian Humanist Podcast, Episode #20: Judas Iscariot

21 April 2010

This week’s theme music is “Judas Skin” from the Vigilantes of Love record Slow Dark Train.


General Introduction

- What’s on the blog?
- An historical moment for the Christian Humanist Podcast
- Detective fiction from Douglas Adams and Terry Pratchett
- Our upcoming series on Lost

Introduction to Judas
- Getting agitated
- How do we picture him?
- Judas as revolutionary and hipster disciple
- What does Iscariot mean?

Etymology of “Judas”
- Judah the son of Israel
- Judas the Maccabee
- What this double lineage means

Jesus and Judas
- Why did Jesus pick Judas?
- Michial gives the Calvinist party line
- Zealots and tax collectors
- Judas as disciple, not betrayer

A Long Tangent About Inerrancy
- The Passover timeline
- Harmony vs. difference
- The search for the historical truth
- How did Judas die?

Judas in Literature
- Dante and “the morning breath of eternity”
- Anglo-Saxon Middle Ages stuff
- A New Kind of Judas: American literature

Judas on Film
- The Matrix (of all things)
- Anti-semitism
- Why The Passion of the Christ is a bad movie

The Ghost of Judas
- His eternal destination
- Did Judas have to do what he did?
- To what extent are we ourselves Judases?
- Judas as fascist poet

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, Douglas. Dirk Gently’s Holistic Detective Agency. New York: Pocket, 1998.

Baum, Paull Franklin. “The Mediæval Legend of Judas Iscariot.” PMLA 31.3 (1916): 481-632.

Beadle, Richard and Pamela M. King, eds. York Mystery Plays: A Selection in Modern Spelling. New York: Oxford UP, 2009.

Buechner, Frederick. Peculiar Treasures: A Biblical Who’s Who. San Francisco: Harper, 1979.

Child, Francis James, ed. The English and Scottish Popular Ballads. New York: Forgotten, 2007. 5 volumes.

Cullen, Countee. “Judas Iscariot.” Collected Poems. New York: Library of America, 2010. (forthcoming)

Dante. The Divine Comedy. Trans. Dorothy L. Sayers. New York: Penguin, 1950. 3 volumes.

Eliot, T.S. “Journey of the Magi.” The Complete Poems and Plays 1909-1950. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1952. 68-69.

Guirgis, Stephen Adly. The Last Days of Judas Iscariot. New York: Dramatists Play Service, 2006.

Kazantzakis, Nikos. The Last Temptation of Christ. New York: Touchstone, 1998.

The Junius Manuscript. Trans. George P. Krapp. New York: Columbia UP, 1931.

Porter, Katherine Anne. “Flowering Judas.” The Collected Stories. New York: Mariner, 1979. 90-102.

Pratchett, Terry. Men at Arms. London: Gollancz, 1993.

Schueler, Donald G. “The Middle English Judas: An Interpretation.” PMLA 91.5 (1976): 840-5.

Wright, Thomas, ed. The Chester Plays: A Collection of Mysteries Founded Upon Scriptural Subjects. New York: Nabu, 2010.

Book Review: The Bridge

20 April 2010

The Bridge: The Life and Rise of Barack Obama
By David Remnick
656 pp. Illustrated. Alfred A. Knopf. $29.95

Early on in his massive new biography of Barack Obama, cryptically titled The Bridge, David Remnick quotes Bob Dylan on the president: “He’s like a fictional character, but he’s real” (41). This comes, of course, from a man who clearly knows a thing or two about (self-) mythologizing, and he’s right. There is something unearthly and unbelievable about our president, something that makes his allies and admirers want to lavish praises (and major prizes, apparently) upon him but makes his opponents distrust him. The story may, in fact, be too good to be true.

Remnick’s task in writing The Bridge seems to be twofold: (a) he wants to deflate the myth by giving Obama to use through the eyes of his friends, family, and classmates; and (b) he wants to increase the power of the myth by presenting Obama as the spiritual heir of the Civil Rights movement—born, as it were, to be the proof of the freedom Martin Luther King and Malcolm X fought and died for. This Civil Rights connection explains the book’s title, which references the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma Alabama, location of the famous “Bloody Sunday” protest.

Remnick seeks to accomplish these two contradictory purposes by a single technique: Tell the whole story in all its magnificent, sweeping grandeur, and in all its minute, personal detail. The technique is, I suppose, not too far off from that of the Gospels (we get Matthew’s genealogies and Mark’s details, like the pillow the disciples put under Christ’s head as He sleeps in the boat). But I don’t want to accuse Obama of Messianic pretensions—beyond the standard presidential egotism—or Remnick of putting him in Elijah’s chair at Passover, so let’s say that The Bridge comes from the same mindset that produces those twenty-page articles at the center of Remnick’s New Yorker. The difference is that Remnick is a more engaging writer than many people in his employ, and so you probably won’t give up abruptly after three paragraphs, skipping ahead to James Wood or David Denby.

This is also the technique of at least one other journalistic biography written by Remnick—his excellent book on Muhammed Ali, King of the World. That book begins with the very long stories of Sonny Liston and Floyd Patterson and goes several chapters without more than a cursory mention of Cassius Clay. Likewise, in The Bridge, we receive education-in-miniature on the Civil Rights movement, Kenyan activist Tom Mboya, Chicago politics, race in the White House, and the American slave narrative—among many other topics.

The effect, of course, is to present Obama’s presidency as the logical conclusion of all of these movements. It is safe to say, then, that Remnick accomplishes purpose (b) far more successfully than he does purpose (a). If we feel we know Barack Obama at the end of The Bridge, it is in the way we feel we know Odysseus or Huck Finn or Rabbit Angstrom—the personal relationship we are able to have with purely fictional characters. The quotes from people who know Obama that are sprinkled liberally through this book can’t quite shatter our sense that he is beyond knowing; they are less likely to change the reader’s mind about Obama and more likely to prop up whatever his or her preconceptions were—good or bad.

Which is not to say that Remnick is non-partisan. At times, The Bridge seems calculated to respond to specific claims and criticisms from its subject’s political adversaries on the Right, mostly without mentioning them by name. Thus, Remnick takes much of a chapter to explain what, exactly, a community organizer does (turns out it’s much more hands-on and street-level than being the mayor of Wasilla, Alaska); he quotes colleague John Owens as saying, contra Glenn Beck, that Obama “was concerned about being fair about whites as well as about blacks” (140); and a supervisor, Eileen Hershenov, remarks that “what [Obama] was pushing was not something tied to identity politics or some sort of ‘cool’ Marxist, Gramsci, theory-oriented thing” (121). Remnick also mentions, quite casually, that “Barack Hussein Obama was born at 7:24 p.m. on August 4, 1961, at Kapi’olani Medical Center, in Honolulu” (55). Conservatives should receive these corrections gracefully—though I fear that Beck, Palin, and the so-called “Birthers” will not—if only because genuine critique involves speaking the whole truth.

On the other hand, this implicitly defensive tone can make The Bridge sound like an apology—or worse, a political hagiography. One gets bogged down, after nearly 600 pages, by the sheer number of times Remnick tells us—or quotes somebody else telling us—some variation of the following:

Obama was never remotely a radical; as a student, lawyer, professor, and politician he had always been a gradualist—liberal in spirit, cautious in nature. Obama was disingenuous when he described [Bill] Ayers merely as “a guy who lives in my neighborhood,” but the idea that they were ever close friends or shared political ideas was preposterous. (547)

To counteract the tide of praise and defense, then, Remnick gives us the occasional critique of Obama. One of the more entertaining of these comes from the insufferable, radical Havard Law professor Roberto Unger, whose style, a combination of stiltedness and haughtiness, will be familiar to anyone who has wandered into graduate school in the humanities:

Obama’s manner in dealing with other people and acting in the world fully exemplifies the cheerful impersonal friendliness—the middle distance—that marks American sociability. (Now allow me to speak as a critic. Remember Madame de Staël’s meetings that deprive us of solitude without affording us company? Or Schopenhauer’s porcupines, who shift restlessly from getting cold at a distance to prickling one another at close quarters, until they settle into some acceptable compromise position?) The cheerful impersonal friendliness serves to mask recesses of loneliness and secretiveness in the American character, and no less with Obama than with anyone else. He is enigmatic—and seemed so as much then as now—in a characteristically American way.

Moreover, he excelled at the style of sociability that is most prized in the American professional and business class and serves as the supreme object of education in the top prep schools: how to cooperate with your peers by casting on them a spell of charismatic seduction, which you nevertheless disguise under a veneer of self-depreciation and informality. (186)

Unger comes off as so unlikeable, however, that his criticism rolls right off of Obama’s back; if this guy doesn’t like him, the reader thinks, then he must be all right. (Indeed, Unger seems to have foreseen this, and tells Remnick that he refused to talk to the press during the campaign because “I am a leftist and, by conviction as well as by temperament, a revolutionary. . . . Any association of mine with Barack Obama in the course of the campaign could do only harm” [185]).

Other critiques come from two leaders of the African-American intelligentsia, namely the Princeton professor Cornel West and the television- and radio-talk-show host Tavis Smiley, both of whom were slow to endorse Obama during the democratic primaries because they perceived him as less than fully interested in the African-American community. As West put it at the time, “Obama is a very decent, brilliant charismatic brother . . . The problem is, is that he’s got folk who are talking to him who warrant our distrust. . . . I want to know, how deep is your love for the people?” (473). West and Smiley both eventually come around to Team Obama, though, signifying either that their concerns are unimportant or that Obama eventually began fulfilling any obligation he had to his race.

Remnick himself is remarkably slow to criticize Obama—a fact that I don’t think points to journalistic objectivity, as I will demonstrate in a moment. He points out several half-truths that came from Obama’s podium. For example, in a speech in Selma during the primaries, Obama claimed that “I’m here because somebody marched” on Bloody Sunday, to which Remnick notes that “Obama was born four years before Bloody Sunday” (21). But these corrections seem meant to point to a higher truth: It doesn’t matter that Obama wasn’t telling the truth, strictly speaking; he was telling a higher truth because who he is is the product of the Civil Rights movement. Obama’s critics will likely roll their eyes at this implied defense on Remnick’s part.

In fact, the first genuine criticism of Obama in Remnick’s voice came, at my count, 226 pages into the book, when the author refers to his subject’s “considerable ego [that] often clashed with Michelle’s desire for stability and a sense of partnership.” On the other hand, just two pages later, Remnick has editor Henry Ferris praising Obama’s “sturdy ego” (228)—so again, the criticism is quickly defused.

Remnick is less ready to pardon Obama’s political opponents, and the sections where he speaks from their points of view feel far less magnanimous; it is at these spots that he sounds most partisan. After Obama’s well-publicized falling-out with Reverend Jeremiah Wright, for example, we’re told a heartbreaking story from Wright’s perspective of death threats and a ruined family vacation. On the other hand, we leave Wright at the end of the chapter (“The Book of Jeremiah,” naturally) feeling glad to have left him behind; Remnick paints him as one step above a deranged street prophet, screaming about past racial injustice in stark contrast to the conciliatory Obama. I couldn’t help but feel that Wright was “thrown under the bus” by Remnick, too.

Hillary Clinton gets a good deal of praise and sympathy for her and her husband’s years of service to and popularity in the African-American community, and yet she and her campaign are portrayed as crafty and scheming, constantly trying to find a way to undermine Obama’s obvious otherness without obviously calling him an outsider. Obviously, Remnick had access to the interior of the Clinton campaign that the rest of us couldn’t possibly hope to duplicate, so we may have to take his word for it here—and yet I found myself wondering how Clinton viewed the section on her campaign.

John McCain, it turns out, is not a bad guy; Remnick praises him for his campaign against George W. Bush in 2000 but portrays him as a sad and helpless man caught in the ugly wheels of political machinery. “It seemed obvious,” he says, referring to the McCain campaign’s use of negative ads, “that McCain felt distaste, or worse, for what he . . . was doing in the name of electoral advantage” (542). There is a hint of condescension in Remnick’s portrayal of McCain—here’s a man who stood in the way of Fate.

Remnick mostly avoids talking about Sarah Palin, but when he finally gets around to it, he offers none of the commiseration that he gave—patronizing or otherwise—to Obama’s other political adversaries. Palin was, in fact, McCain’s final humiliation in a campaign destined to destroy his credibility not just as a politician but as a human being:

Privately, McCain’s aides knew that they had done themselves enormous injury by nominating Sarah Palin. She had proved herself so wildly undereducated in the affairs of the country and the world, so willing to say or do anything as long as she attracted attention, that it made McCain look weak and, worse, cynical. . . . It is unclear that another Vice-Presidential nominee would have helped McCain avoid losing—not in the midst of an economic free-fall with a weak, unpopular Republican President in the White House—but she did help him lose ingloriously. She behaved erratically, heedlessly, and McCain did nothing to stop her. By giving himself over to her rhetoric, by failing to put an end to the sort of smears she reveled in, McCain had forfeited some part of what he valued most in himself—his sense of honor. (555)

I am no great fan of Sarah Palin, but considering that the section on the actual 2008 election is so short, Remnick’s time might have been better spent talking about Obama’s method and successes than kicking dirt into the face of the losers.

The most interesting part of the book for me was the description of Obama’s long formal education, first at Occidental, then at Columbia and Harvard. He was no great student at Occidental, but got serious when he went to Columbia and lived, we’re told, like a monk. He also took a class with noted Postcolonial Theorist Edward Said. It didn’t stick. Obama’s college buddy Phil Boerner tells us that Obama “would rather read Shakespeare’s plays than the criticism.” Obama himself refers to Said—whose Orientalism, once a standard of Theory syllabuses, has come under enormous fire in the last few years—“as a ‘flake’” (113). Skeptics of critical theory, rejoice.

Anecdotes like these make The Bridge worth reading for anyone with more than a passing interest—pro or con—in its subject matter, but it has two main problems, as I see them. First, the reader grows weary of hearing that Obama is, as Remnick puts it in one of his many variations on the theme, “multilingual, a shapeshifter” (18). We hear this over and over again, both from Remnick’s narrative voice and from the people he interviews. “Barack is the interpreter,” says a friend from Harvard. “To be a good interpreter means you need fluency in two languages, as well as cultural fluency on both sides” (190).

This is most definitely what liberals would like Obama to be, and we heard about it nearly ad nauseum during the campaign. That it has certainly not proven true on the national stage may point more to obstinacy in certain Republican circles than to delusion among Obama’s friends and acquaintances—but it certainly makes The Bridge’s repeated insistence on this facet of his personality ring less than true.

The second problem is related to the first and is more serious. The vision of Obama Remnick puts forward is remarkably similar to the one put forward by Obama and his handlers—not hagiographic, mind you, but perhaps a little too eager to accept the official facts at face value.

Of course, Remnick is not an investigative reporter and has not, to the best of my knowledge, ever claimed to be one. But his unwillingness to dig a little deeper makes The Bridge, for all its thoroughness, a little toothless. It reveals a hole in the political publishing world, a need for another sort of book: a critical biography by a writer who is nevertheless sympathetic to Obama’s person and politics.

It is unfair, however, to condemn an author for what he hasn’t sought to do, and given Remnick’s clear purpose, he has written a worthwhile book that inhabits the uneasy space between biography and puff piece—but learning more toward the former.

Next Page »